Thinking about AFRICOM’s think tank
The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is launching a think tank based in Germany to inform and support DOD missions.  The AFRICOM SSRC Information Paper explains that the Social Science Research Center (SSRC) will be staffed by a core group of scholars with PhDs who will also be able to deploy Socio-Cultural Research and Advisory Teams (SCRAT) to the field, in coordination with in-country teams. “For example, prior to a U.S. military exercise, a SCRAT may conduct a socio-cultural assessment to better focus U.S. efforts and develop beneficial objectives. They may then accompany U.S. forces during the exercise in a cultural advisory capacity and conduct a post-exercise assessment of the impact on the local population.”
The written products and research activities “will be conducted in an atmosphere of full disclosure and transparency,” and the SSRC director Dr. Christopher Varhola is so far taking this seriously by openly circulating the SSRC Guidelines and Procedures which you can download here. Because the guidelines are still in draft form, this is an opportunity for Africanists to constructively share their ideas and concerns — without necessarily endorsing AFRICOM or its missions.
I have several concerns, the first of which centers on the ability of the SSRC to comply with its stated commitment to the “do no harm” principle in Section 5 of the guidelines. SSRC researchers plan to comply with human rights and research conventions “to the best of our abilities.” In addition the Code of Ethics in Appendix A states that scholars “will not directly support the use of armed force” (emphasis added). This language reads like an obvious loophole; the American Anthropology Association’s standards perhaps offer a stronger model here. Though the guidelines also contain strong language requiring informed consent “freely given…from all participants”, there is no apparent independent check comparable to a university human subjects approval process to promote compliance and protection of subjects. To maintain the trust of local populations, and to not “harm our credibility as social scientists” (Section 2B) such a check is essential.
The SSRC also lacks sufficient independence in critical respects. Section 3 of the guidelines states that “All research designs must be approved by a U.S. Africa Command panel.” I have one question: Why? Though the panel will “likely” include outside academic reviewers, and the intent is to “balance institutional needs and constraints with academic freedom,” the authorities as stated and the process as described sets up a lopsided balance of interests. This may even make SSRC researchers themselves vulnerable. Researchers instead need incentives to design projects that can deliver honest and blunt assessments — and they need protection from interference with their ability to publicly and widely share such information. For a historical perspective, some of the hazards of scholarly collaboration with the national security state are discussed in a compelling chapter by Dwyer and Dwyer in my co-edited book, In Democracy’s Shadow: the Secret World of National Security. You can also check out The Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945 – 1960 by Christopher Simpson.
May 28, 2010
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David Vine - June 2, 2010
Some random thoughts. Thanks Carl for posting this.
A few other thoughts:
“to provide socio-cultural advice in support of DoD activities, to include exercises, humanitarian civic action, and interaction with security forces”: this seems to include combat, though perhaps not.
Indeed, there is some work contemplated with US forces (i.e. like HTTs, embedded in brigades): “They may then accompany U.S. forces during the exercise in a cultural advisory capacity and conduct a post-exercise assessment of the impact on the local population”
“All SCRAT research activities will be conducted in an atmosphere of full disclosure and transparency.”: doubtful and hard to believe given the nature of the military.
Can any researcher affiliated with the U.S. military (or any military) get informed consent that is non-coercive given their military affiliation.
In the code of ethics, note that there is no “do no harm” provision as in the American Anthropological Association code e.g. The priority of the SSRC is AFRICOM, not those populations studied. (though page 4 has a reference.)
“5. We will avoid deception and misrepresentation when interacting with research subjects. We will not use research as a cover for covert intelligence activities, nor for political partisan purposes.’ Note the word “avoid” (also “we strive” in #4). Also the word covert. These are likely to be intelligence gathering activities, just not covert it seems.
“6. We will use our data solely for the advancement of knowledge and scholarship.”: Other text suggests otherwise; see their mission statement.
Gerald LeMelle - June 6, 2010
Thanks so much for this Carl. I wholeheartedly concur with the concerns raised by you and David. It seems that the only things missing in the Guidelines are the ‘winks!’The language used here reminds me of the clumsy attempts by the DOD in 2007 to imply that AFRICOM was primarily a ‘humanitarian effort.’
Any effort to improve the education and understanding of AFRICOM/DOD personnel about the countries they are operating and the motivations of their leaders is more then welcome. However, one of the many concerns Africans consistently raise about AFRICOM is its support for the militaries of and subsequent entrenchment of friendly but manipulative, non democratic and sometimes brutal leaders. Everyone at AFRICOM knows this. Some even argue that this is wise policy for protecting US interests. New studies on trends in local communities in Africa or tips on how to speak to a local chief without offending will be pointless.
The SSRC works for AFRICOM and if for example, the SSRC should happen to conclude that a particular action would have damaging long term consequences for democratic aspirations for the local people, I am certain that their concerns like those of the Department of State would be ignored.
On a positive side 1) at least the guidelines acknowledge that Africans are not happy with AFRICOM, and 2) the whole effort acknowledges that the Department of State is not a full partner in AFRICOM as we were intially told. In fact, State’s role actually diminishes here because normally the information on impact of US policy on local communities is provided by the DOS.
David Dwyer - July 15, 2010
Another major concern we have with the establishment of AFRICOM’s SSRC has to do with its plan to assure openness, independence, and adherence to ethical standards of its research. According to its Guiding Principles, the AFRICOM SSRC will have a review panel that includes the SSRC Director, a military lawyer, a political-military affairs specialist and “most likely” a chaplain and outside academic reviewer. Because the review board is appointed from within AFRICOM, it lacks the autonomy necessary to guarantee its guiding principles.
To understand the problem, let us compare AFRICOM’s procedures with the academic process of reviewing research proposals. Every application for an external grant must be reviewed by the university’s institutional review board (IRB). This board is comprised of the scholar’s peers who review the proposal to make sure that research results will be publically available (openness), that there are no conflicts of interest (independence) and that the rights of subjects will be respected (ethics). Failure of the researcher to comply with research guidelines will result in disciplinary action and failure of the university’s IRB to administer the guidelines will result in discipline for the university.
Despite the brief characterization of the academic process, it is clear that it is one that is effective in guaranteeing the openness, independence and ethicality of the proposed research and far superior to AFRICOM’s SSRC guidelines. If AFRICOM SSRC wants guarantee its own guidelines, we suggest that they follow the IRB process. Better yet, why not just issue RFPs directly and let the existing academic IRBs do the work for them?
David and Anabel Dwyer
Carl LeVan - August 8, 2010
REP. TIERNEY’S NEW GAO REPORT ON AFRICOM
Thanks to a new General Accounting Office (GAO) report, we now have a greater sense of the programmatic definitions used to implement AFRICOM’s strategic vision. The report, ordered by the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, chaired by Rep. John Tierney, identifies how the new Command assesses its progress in Africa:
(1) objective factors, including the number of al-Qaeda identified members in a country
(2) subjective factors, such as the likelihood of an imminent terrorist attack
(3) perceptive factors, including how much protection against terrorism Africans expect their governments to provide
One of the report’s main findings is that these criteria are being used for planning but not program monitoring. This naturally makes it difficult to evaluate the long term impact of individual operations and integrate them into broader overall US efforts. (My former boss in Congress used to chair this subcommittee…Rep. Tierney clearly has the ingredients of a great hearing here.)
The GAO reports that “DOD and State have not carried out systematic program monitoring of funds for projects that, among other things, train and equip partner nations’ militaries to conduct counterterrorism operations.” An apparent reliance on “anecdotal information” must sound doubly frustrating to USAID and its many civilian implementers, who are subject to scrutiny and regular congressional queries. It’s a different story apparently with DOD, where fewer than a quarter of 58 AFRICOM projects reviewed by the GAO included any plan for program monitoring. This is a scandal waiting to happen along any number of scenarios, including possibilities such as failed projects touted as big successes, or the actual example offered by staff at an East African embassy: the choice of location for a well disrupted and destabilized local clan relations.
AFRICOM now has established a presence in 17 U.S. embassies in Africa, and the report offers new information about reactions within some of those posts. Apparently the diplomats are feeling a bit burdened with requests from their new colleagues. This brings up a broader concern relating to the potential for AFRICOM activities to undermine diplomatic and development missions – duly noted by former ambassadors including those who have posted here, and mentioned by numerous scholars in an excellent special issue on AFRICOM in the journal Contemporary Security Policy last year. Some activities such as technical assistance for maritime and navigation training seem to pose few problems at embassies. But “based on concerns raised by interagency officials, other activities may not fully align with U.S. foreign policy goals or they may not reflect the most effective use of resources,” writes the GAO. This illustrates how problems stemming from AFRICOM’s inter-agency component remain more than merely bureaucratic bungles or stove-piping.
As discussed in the various “Africom Think Tank” postings above, the inter-agency component presents very real challenges to different cultures of learning. Diplomats interviewed by the GAO “expressed concern about the U.S. military performing this type of research itself instead of coordinating with interagency partners to gain sociocultural information.” Where they don’t conflict with existing foreign policy missions, AFRICOM’s research efforts often duplicate existing information. An internal State Department memorandum this spring emphasized the need for AFRICOM to share its local research results. If this memo was necessary in the first place, it certainly presages the type of tensions that will arise between academics at AFRICOM’s think tank and Pentagon cultures of secrecy, and it already shows how the supposedly revitalized State Department is embarking on what looks like a low level turf battle that could have far reaching implications for foreign policy coordination. Will Congress give State and USAID the tools it needs?
You can find a complete copy of the GAO report, entitled, “Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa” here.
Michael Stulman - August 10, 2010
Hi Carl,
You might enjoy reading a similar blog on Africa Action’s website, written by our intern Beth Tuckey. She titled it “New Government Report Highlights AFRICOM’s Many Incompetencies.”
Africa Action is open to collaborating with your blog in the future, from contributing to discussions and linking to one another’s posts. In the mean time, I will add your website to our blog roll since it’s so relevant to our work as well.
best,
Michael
John Brown - August 10, 2010
Thank you for this important piece, which I will cite with pleasure in my Pulic Diplomacy Review.
Liza Briggs - September 25, 2010
I am pleased to see that you and those who have posted here are raising the same issues that my colleagues and I are grappling with as members of the very first iteration of AFRICOMs SSRC.
There is certainly much more to flesh out with regard to the ethical considerations and even the nature of the relationship that academics should have with the DOD but from my perspective the attempt to engage with military is a useful endeavor.
In June, I completed fieldwork to support a study of perceptions regarding the reform process that led to the overhaul of the army in Liberia. My study was developed using the guidelines discussed in the post. I also met with the review board. My sense is that we are working toward developing standards that will provide us the space and the protection to perform as we would in more academic settings. It is a process and we are fairly new.
Another reality is that we are working in an applied research environment. This means that aspects of our work and how we do our work will have to change. For example, we are learning that we have to condense our research production time for studies so that our findings are timely and relevant to our audience. The changes, however must not compromise the integrity of academic research. The struggle to find the middle ground is at the heart of the discussions that are happening in and around our work. A critical but open minded group of academics, to include folks like me who are in the proverbial trenches would do much to further this goal.
Finally, it seems to me that an important part of the discussion about what it means to work with DOD and AFRICOM and in any other applied setting should focus on the researchers experience and obligation to the craft of research. Well written ethical guidelines and standards are still only guidelines. Researchers have to understand them and have the committment to abide by them.
Best Regards,
Liza Briggs
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