There is certainly much more to flesh out with regard to the ethical considerations and even the nature of the relationship that academics should have with the DOD but from my perspective the attempt to engage with military is a useful endeavor.

In June, I completed fieldwork to support a study of perceptions regarding the reform process that led to the overhaul of the army in Liberia. My study was developed using the guidelines discussed in the post. I also met with the review board. My sense is that we are working toward developing standards that will provide us the space and the protection to perform as we would in more academic settings. It is a process and we are fairly new.

Another reality is that we are working in an applied research environment. This means that aspects of our work and how we do our work will have to change. For example, we are learning that we have to condense our research production time for studies so that our findings are timely and relevant to our audience. The changes, however must not compromise the integrity of academic research. The struggle to find the middle ground is at the heart of the discussions that are happening in and around our work. A critical but open minded group of academics, to include folks like me who are in the proverbial trenches would do much to further this goal.

Finally, it seems to me that an important part of the discussion about what it means to work with DOD and AFRICOM and in any other applied setting should focus on the researchers experience and obligation to the craft of research. Well written ethical guidelines and standards are still only guidelines. Researchers have to understand them and have the committment to abide by them.

Best Regards,

Liza Briggs

Africa Action is open to collaborating with your blog in the future, from contributing to discussions and linking to one another’s posts. In the mean time, I will add your website to our blog roll since it’s so relevant to our work as well.

best,

Michael

Thanks to a new General Accounting Office (GAO) report, we now have a greater sense of the programmatic definitions used to implement AFRICOM’s strategic vision. The report, ordered by the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, chaired by Rep. John Tierney, identifies how the new Command assesses its progress in Africa:

(1) objective factors, including the number of al-Qaeda identified members in a country
(2) subjective factors, such as the likelihood of an imminent terrorist attack
(3) perceptive factors, including how much protection against terrorism Africans expect their governments to provide

One of the report’s main findings is that these criteria are being used for planning but not program monitoring. This naturally makes it difficult to evaluate the long term impact of individual operations and integrate them into broader overall US efforts. (My former boss in Congress used to chair this subcommittee…Rep. Tierney clearly has the ingredients of a great hearing here.)

The GAO reports that “DOD and State have not carried out systematic program monitoring of funds for projects that, among other things, train and equip partner nations’ militaries to conduct counterterrorism operations.” An apparent reliance on “anecdotal information” must sound doubly frustrating to USAID and its many civilian implementers, who are subject to scrutiny and regular congressional queries. It’s a different story apparently with DOD, where fewer than a quarter of 58 AFRICOM projects reviewed by the GAO included any plan for program monitoring. This is a scandal waiting to happen along any number of scenarios, including possibilities such as failed projects touted as big successes, or the actual example offered by staff at an East African embassy: the choice of location for a well disrupted and destabilized local clan relations.

AFRICOM now has established a presence in 17 U.S. embassies in Africa, and the report offers new information about reactions within some of those posts. Apparently the diplomats are feeling a bit burdened with requests from their new colleagues. This brings up a broader concern relating to the potential for AFRICOM activities to undermine diplomatic and development missions – duly noted by former ambassadors including those who have posted here, and mentioned by numerous scholars in an excellent special issue on AFRICOM in the journal Contemporary Security Policy last year. Some activities such as technical assistance for maritime and navigation training seem to pose few problems at embassies. But “based on concerns raised by interagency officials, other activities may not fully align with U.S. foreign policy goals or they may not reflect the most effective use of resources,” writes the GAO. This illustrates how problems stemming from AFRICOM’s inter-agency component remain more than merely bureaucratic bungles or stove-piping.

As discussed in the various “Africom Think Tank” postings above, the inter-agency component presents very real challenges to different cultures of learning. Diplomats interviewed by the GAO “expressed concern about the U.S. military performing this type of research itself instead of coordinating with interagency partners to gain sociocultural information.” Where they don’t conflict with existing foreign policy missions, AFRICOM’s research efforts often duplicate existing information. An internal State Department memorandum this spring emphasized the need for AFRICOM to share its local research results. If this memo was necessary in the first place, it certainly presages the type of tensions that will arise between academics at AFRICOM’s think tank and Pentagon cultures of secrecy, and it already shows how the supposedly revitalized State Department is embarking on what looks like a low level turf battle that could have far reaching implications for foreign policy coordination. Will Congress give State and USAID the tools it needs?

You can find a complete copy of the GAO report, entitled, “Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa” here.