Power Sharing Agreements and Problematic Elections in Africa
Are power sharing agreements a bad solution to flawed African elections? In the January 2011 issue of Governance, I point out that most of what we know about successful power sharing comes from either post-conflict countries or from cases which actually lack important features of power sharing models. However, many of Africa’s recent power sharing agreements were brokered as solutions to bad elections.
Just days after the article appeared, the Ivory Coast began what is now a familiar stalemate after elections: President Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power to Alassane Ouattra, whom the electoral commission had declared winner of the UN-monitored the election. Gbago still has the loyalty of thousands of troops, and he is demanding that his challenger enter into a power sharing arrangement. An overview of Africa’s upcoming elections in Africa Confidential says “most will range from widespread fraud to messy multiparty compromise.”
If things go wrong in some of Africa’s 17 elections in 2011, the international community may again prescribe power sharing rather than pressuring stubborn incumbents to depart. But there are important lessons to be learned. In cases such Kenya and Zimbabwe, power sharing has arguably undermined vertical accountability between voters and politicians, increased government spending, and contributed to policy gridlock.
The rise of power sharing has led to a little noticed shift: after two decades of emphasizing the importance of building institutions, democracy promotion now often puts peace before “process.” This has signaled to electoral losers that they can rewrite the rules of the game if they threaten violence. My article argues that that the difficult tradeoffs of these situations can be remedied in part by sunset clauses, evenhanded prosecution of human rights violations, and by strengthening checks on executives.
Currently, the publishers of Governance are generously offering the article, “Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa’s Uncertain Democracies,” for free download on the journal’s website.

- From rear left: Andrew Reynolds, Andrew Rizzardi, John Harbeson, Wonbin Cho, Rachel Sullivan Robinson, Gina Lambright, Martina Hanulova, Ned McMahon, Jerry Lavery, Ian Spears, Zeric Smith, Michael Alandu, Adigun Agbaje, Joy Ohagwu, Almami Cyllah, Franklin Oduro, Assen Assenov, Nic van de Walle, Eldred Masunungure, John Campbell, Peter Lewis, Staffan Lindberg, Jeremy Horowitz, Karuti Kanyinga, Carl LeVan. (Absent: Eric Bjornlund, John Ayoade, Todd Eisenstadt, Tom Bridle)
The genesis of this article was an amazing workshop at American University in 2009, organized by the Africa Council and funded in part by USAID.  (Of course the views in the article are my own.)
A subsequent USAID meeting in Kenya on “Elections and Stability” raised other important questions. Â I hope this posting will be the beginning of the next discussion!
January 12, 2011
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4 Responses
Lai Erinosho - January 12, 2011
Many thanks for Carl’s paper which underscores the crisis in democratic governance in Africa today. Holding election and ensuring that it is free and fair is still a major African burden. Also, allowing winners from the opposition parties to take power after successfully holding credible election is another nightmare. All of these continue to undermine stability and peaceful co-existence and above development in the affected African countries The civil society should continue to exert pressure on sit-tight leaders and am sure African countries will get there in due course. In addition, the international community especially the major powers (US and Europe) have a role to play. Many sit-tight African leaders starch the stolen public funds away in Western Banks to the knowledge of the authorities in these countries. Some of them are alleged to be funders of political parties (e.g. Bongo and France in recent revelations). It is about time to tie this to good governance in developing African countries through concrete step devoid of hypocrisy on the part of purveyors of democratic governance, namely Western countries. Sit-tight African Leaders and Western Banks should be accountable. Travel ban should be placed on these leaders, next of kin and cohorts by the US and other Western countries. Finally, Euro-America should also make it difficult for off shore banks in other parts of the world where stolen funds are kept to operate. The US is doing same with Switzerland and Luxembourg etc. If the US can take steps on the funds stolen by its citizen through tax evasion, it can lead the way for other African countries that not inclined to do so.
John Campbell - January 18, 2011
Carl’s article in Governance lays out the shortcomings of power sharing as a solution to political crises following failed elections. His writing is based on deep research and he draws of his thorough knowledge of the relevant academic theoretical frameworks. His specific reference is to Zimbabwe and Kenya. But I hope policy makers pay attention to his arguments as they consider next steps in Cote d’Ivoire. Adam Nossiter shows how Laurent Gbagbo, the Ivorian strongman defeated in the Ivorian elections, is hanging on to power despite significant financial sanctions from the international community. Violence in Cote d’Ivoire is increasing, with some two hundred deaths reported already –the true figure is likely to be higher. As Gbagbo entrenches himself and as the deaths mount, there will almost certainly be calls within the international community taken up by Gbagbo’s supporters for power sharing that will enable the strongman to hang on to much of his power. After all, that would stop the killing, so the argument will be.
But power sharing following credible elections is undemocratic and, in the case of Cote d’Ivoire, does not address the fundamental religious, ethnic, and economic divisions that are the root cause of the current political crisis. At best, power sharing in Cote d’Ivoire will merely kick the problem down the road, as has happened in Zimbabwe and Kenya where the next elections pose significant risk of yet more bloodshed.
Carl LeVan - May 6, 2011
The Spirit of Awolowo Lives (?)
Nigeria’s 2011 election surprised many observers and monitors for its comparative improvement over previous elections in 2007 and 2003. Yet the country erupted in violence as Goodluck Jonathan’s election denied the north their “turn” to rule (more on that in an upcoming post). So Johanthan responded as many African presidents have, telling the country’s citizens “Now, we must all unite” and promising “to run an all-inclusive government.” As noted in my essay recently published in “Governance,” unity governments such as the one proposed by Jonathan are a common remedy for election violence.
So far the two leading opposition parties have unequivocally declared their intention to not participate – and to even ask members who do want to serve to leave the party. The ACN explained that the problem with a Government of National Unity “is that it stifles democracy by compromising virile opposition which is a key ingredient of a vibrant democracy, thereby encouraging the emergence of a one-party state. It also stunts development and promotes complacency.”
Former minister El-Rufai said his party, the CPC “is unlikely” to be part of the administration, noting that this means in effect that “a large swathe of the North will be in opposition for the first time in Nigeria’s political history.” (See for example “Nigeria: Is Jonathan’s ‘Unity Govt’ Dead Before Inauguration?” in Leadership.)
Interestingly enough, this in some ways coincides with how Nigerians actually understand democracy. According to Afrobarometer surveys, only 1.9 percent define democracy in terms lending themselves to “unity” or “power sharing.” (Like most African countries, 25 percent of Nigerians define democracy in terms of civil liberties, while nearly 35 percent, more than any other country, define it in terms of “government by, for, of the people.”)
Jonathan did the right thing by making a gesture of inclusiveness – but the opposition might just be doing the best thing for democracy by declining the offer. With gains in the National Assembly, and likely growing gains in the states, the opposition – though mostly split between two parties – will now be in a better position than ever to ask the ruling party to justify is policy performance.
Chike - June 11, 2011
Found your blog interesting. However, you need to look at Nigeria with a fresh set of eyes. Nigeria is rapidly evolving and using old categories to understand new problems will not be helpful.
First, although the CPC represents the aspirations of the dispossessed in the North, the “talakawas” it is not yet the “defacto” Northern party – results of other elections point to that fact. CPC was distinguished by its lack of organisation and over-reliance on the core North, it also has little traction outside Buhari.
(Most Northern governors either belong to the PDP or the ANPP).
Four years is a very long time and the Northern elite have more to gain from aligning themselves with the PDP than from shouting themselves hoarse in the CPC. Northern Nigeria does not have a history of opposition politics, so I cannot see them playing opposition effectively for the next four years, its not their style, they’ll prefer to influence things from within the ruling party.
Secondly, Jonathan is genuinely popular in the Niger Delta South-East, South-West and most importantly, the “Middle-Belt” regions of Nigeria. So he has very widespread support. He is in a much stronger position than El-Rufai would have you believe.
Thirdly, let me give you an alternative explanation for why Nigerians defined democracy as “the government of the people by the people for the people”. We are taught those words in primary school – I learned them in my Civics class and I can rattle them off even when woken up from sleep.
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