New report chronicles Nigeria migration

A new report by the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, DC offers a broad analysis of the internal migration and cross-border trends affecting Nigeria.  Entitled “Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant,” the report gives a historical overview of the major post-independence trends, ranging from unsettled claims from the Biafran Civil War to current problems raised by human trafficking and the significant displacement triggered by the expansion of Shari’a in the northern states starting after the transition to democracy in 1999.

During a trip to Nigeria in 2008, I was struck by the first billboard I saw on the airport road in Abuja, highlighting the problem of human trafficking. According to government agencies, at least 10,000 people are trafficked from Nigeria each year.  The report also mentions how the state of Akwa Ibom in particular is apparently source for people eventually forced into domestic servitude.

Religious violence in Plateau and Kaduna states regularly gets international attention.  The Biafran question, by contrast, remains one of at least three migration issues lurking in the background though.  A prominent Igbo politician told me during a 2006 interview that compensation for property seized during the war remains a source of great resentment in the southeast; many cases are still stuck in the courts.  Worse, he said, the ruling People’s Democratic Party has neglected the issue entirely, and he further complained about under-representation of the east in the Federal government’s civil service and military ranks (which has possibly been addressed a bit more since then).

Second, like the human rights report I co-authored with Patrick Ukata, the MPI report also mentions the problem of discrimination against people from other states.  Discrimination against Nigerians treated as “strangers” in their own country is behind much of the recent violence in Plateau – the religious overtones were present but arguably shallow by causal comparison.  For an interesting theoretical framework for these issues, check out David Laitin’s classic Culture and Hegemony.

A third issue not discussed in the report, but one which will may become another flash point in the near future, is the displacement of people who migrated to Abuja, especially after the democratic transition.  Tens of thousands of people were displaced first during beautification campaigns (my favorite bars in Zone 4 are gone, and my favorite bukkas in Wuse 2 were destroyed to make way for Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000).    More recently demolitions have been part of efforts to ensure that the city of Abuja conforms as much as possible to its original plan. I am working to obtain funding for a collaborative research project with the University of Ibadan in the summer of 2011 to interview those affected – and those profiting from this destruction.   I took this picture (below) near Idu in March 2010.  During meetings with Ibgo self-help organizations, members told me stories of how they rented property from chiefs belonging Abuja’s indigenes, then when their homes and businesses were destroyed by the government’s Ministry for the Federal Capital Territory, the migrants discovered they had no recourse because either the chiefs did not have the authority to rent to them in the first place, or their properties did not have building permits.

Resentment is building, and it is impossible for these working class families to afford housing within the city itself; traffic was non-existent when I lived in Abuja and now it takes upwards of an hour to commute into the city each morning for most of the people who clean the floors and answer the phones.  Thanks to MPI for providing excellent background on migration issues generally, and I hope to provide more insights into the Abuja question after I have had a chance to do more research in the city’s informal settlements.

July 4, 2010   Posted in: .  One Comment

IG Reports U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia Overwhelmed by DOD

According to a “sensitive but unclassified” report from the U.S. State Department’s Inspector General on the US Embassy in Ethiopia just released, the Embassy suffered high staff turnover in the wake of unpopular decisions pushed through by the Bush Administration.  As a result, it is struggling to cope with important changes, including a pending facility move and a massive influx of Department of Defense staff.

The report describes the Embassy as “akin to a forward military base” and raises concerns about civilian staff being overwhelmed by DOD personnel who need to be more closely controlled by the diplomats.  According to the IG, the Embassy staff is “somewhat underpowered in terms of dealing with other agencies within the mission, including a dozen or so Department of Defense elements, some not entirely under chief of mission authority and/or prone to resist the chargé’s authority almost to the point of insubordination” (emphasis added).

This elaborates upon a problem documented in a 2006 Minority Staff report prepared by Senator Richard Lugar’s staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign.  It is also important because DOD emphasized partnerships with civilian authority in order to sell its Africa Command (AFRICOM) to the American and African publics.  The IG report offers troubling evidence that three years after the controversies slipped from the public view, lines of authority remained blurred and the diplomatic ingredient of the “3 D’s” remains overshadowed by defense.   The DOD staff embedded in the Embassy also includes a media relations team, suggesting involvement in the “phase zero” operations designed to shape potential conflict environments.  As numerous former diplomats have told me over the last year, U.S. ambassadors have very limited control over these operations so they often work at odds with U.S. diplomatic strategies.

Training and Foreign Aid Despite Human Rights Violations?

A December 2009 visit by a senior Department of Defense official (reportedly the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa Vicki Huddleston) increased the likelihood that Ethiopia will regain its eligibility for Section 1206 military assistance.   Unless strict conditions have been satisfied, the Leahy Amendment prohibits assistance furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any foreign security forces if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights.  Ethiopia was originally de-qualified for this aid following the 2005 elections.  Today, evidence of such violations is abundant, notwithstanding the relative calm on Election Day this year.  As Human Rights Watch pointed out last week in Congressional testimony, “voters were intimidated at almost every stage” of the process.  Repression remains widespread, thanks in no small part to a sweeping Anti-Terrorism Proclamation issued last year.  (For some solid and balanced comparative research on the effects of exporting American counter-terror legislation, check out the work of political scientist Beth Whitaker at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte.)

Thus the likely resumption of military training and financing is surprising, and in my opinion threatens to bring the U.S. back to the bad old Cold War days of choosing security over democracy.  Remember El Salvador?  Apparently not.  Even though the Embassy staff is managing well in a number of areas, the Inspector General further suggests that an increase in government repression will not alter the U.S. reliance on Ethiopia to provide stability for the region.

June 23, 2010   Posted in: .  One Comment

Thinking about AFRICOM’s think tank

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is launching a think tank based in Germany to inform and support DOD missions.   The AFRICOM SSRC Information Paper explains that the Social Science Research Center (SSRC) will be staffed by a core group of scholars with PhDs  who will also be able to deploy Socio-Cultural Research and Advisory Teams (SCRAT) to the field, in coordination with in-country teams.  “For example, prior to a U.S. military exercise, a SCRAT may conduct a socio-cultural assessment to better focus U.S. efforts and develop beneficial objectives.  They may then accompany U.S. forces during the exercise in a cultural advisory capacity and conduct a post-exercise assessment of the impact on the local population.”

The written products and research activities “will be conducted in an atmosphere of full disclosure and transparency,” and the SSRC director Dr. Christopher Varhola is so far taking this seriously by openly circulating the SSRC Guidelines and Procedures which you can download here.  Because the guidelines are still in draft form, this is an opportunity for Africanists to constructively share their ideas and concerns — without necessarily endorsing AFRICOM or its missions.

I have several concerns, the first of which centers on the ability of the SSRC to comply with its stated commitment to the “do no harm” principle in Section 5 of the guidelines.  SSRC researchers plan to comply with human rights and research conventions “to the best of our abilities.”  In addition the Code of Ethics in Appendix A states that scholars “will not directly support the use of armed force” (emphasis added).  This language reads like an obvious loophole; the American Anthropology Association’s standards perhaps offer a stronger model here.  Though the guidelines also contain strong language requiring informed consent “freely given…from all participants”, there is no apparent independent check comparable to a university human subjects approval process to promote compliance and protection of subjects.  To maintain the trust of local populations, and to not “harm our credibility as social scientists” (Section 2B) such a check is essential.

The SSRC also lacks sufficient independence in critical respects.  Section 3 of the guidelines states that “All research designs must be approved by a U.S. Africa Command panel.”  I have one question: Why? Though the panel will “likely” include outside academic reviewers, and the intent is to “balance institutional needs and constraints with academic freedom,” the authorities as stated and the process as described sets up a lopsided balance of interests.  This may even make SSRC researchers themselves vulnerable.  Researchers instead need incentives to design projects that can deliver honest and blunt assessments — and they need protection from interference with their ability to publicly and widely share such information.  For a historical perspective, some of the hazards of scholarly collaboration with the national security state are discussed in a compelling chapter by Dwyer and Dwyer in my co-edited book, In Democracy’s Shadow: the Secret World of National Security. You can also check out The Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945 – 1960 by Christopher Simpson.

May 28, 2010   Posted in: .  3 Comments

When the Acting President “acts presidential”

During his April 12 address to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, Nigeria’s Acting President, Goodluck Jonathan adopted the tone and tenor of a reformer.  Unfortunately he offered only a few encouraging signs of reform.

He outlined electoral reform, Niger Delta development, fighting corruption, and improving electricity as his principle goals.   This indicates a refreshing sense of consistency with his other recent messages, suggesting that there is indeed a “Jonathan Agenda” taking shape.  This agenda has been properly discrete, given the lingering uncertain status of Yar’Adua’s health.  Yet to establish his credibility abroad and to generate political support for reform at home, Jonathan will have to provide a level of detail that is so far missing during his visit.  He will also have to prioritize what so far sounds a bit like a laundry list of Nigeria’s ongoing challenges.

His reticence about his meeting with Obama the day before is understandable, and there was even a hint in his CFR comments that he was surprised that several other people attended what he thought was going to be a private meeting.

Electoral Reform

Jonathan’s public commitment to electoral reform is refreshing and significant.  His stated commitment to allowing observers would depart from the strategy of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in 2007, which involved erecting obstacles for domestic and international civil society.  He made clear that results should be declared at the polling unit level too, which he specified as a valuable means of demonstrating that elections are fair and verifiable.  Such issues will fall in the lap of INEC, and following the firing of the attorney general and then the cabinet a few weeks later,  Maurice Iwu, the discredited chair of INEC has been awaiting his fate.  Jonathan provided some clues as to his next step by indicating that the term of several commissioners will soon expire, implying that Iwu’s dismissal is only a matter of time.

The disadvantage to waiting, of course, is that the 2011 election then becomes another hurried preparation process, replete with systematic corruption that can be blamed on logistical problems — which was precisely my own observation during 2003.   A more urgent concern is his allusion that much of this reform can be accomplished without legislation.  This comes as a great surprise since the National Assembly has been feverishly working on electoral reform amendments for several months, which will certainly require Jonathan’s signature.  Electoral reform decreed or administratively implemented by an acting president is a recipe for electoral dystopia.

Human Rights and the Niger Delta

His answers were decidedly evasive on two key questions yesterday: First, asked about impunity by a representative of Human Rights Watch in the audience, Jonathan said that the security forces often respond heavily because they are outgunned – and those guns significantly come from the West.  While he entirely has my sympathy, and the U.S. Congressional Research Service has indeed documented alarming arms export trends to Africa, this response has little to do with him making a commitment from the top to investigate and prosecute human rights violations at all levels and to follow the trail wherever it may lead (anyone watching Kenya?) His reference to the weather in Plateau State as a source of the migration that in turn led to violence in Jos sounded downright odd, and perhaps a bit like Montesquieu.

Nevertheless, his request for help from the U.S. on stemming small arms traffic in Nigeria is a near 180 degree reversal from the statements offered by Nigerian Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe all through last year.  Africom, will you stem the flow of arms or will you contribute to the flow of arms?  Obama has an opportunity to respond to a major African leader ’s offer by creating disincentives for commercial arms sales and by enhancing the human rights conditionalities placed on government financing for arms sales.

Second, Jonathan’s response on the Niger Delta properly outlined the basic elements of the ongoing amnesty program, including demobilization and reintegration.  But he missed an opportunity to demonstrate his seriousness by acknowledging its tragically modest progress so far — including reintegration camps for hundreds of militants without adequate toilets or showers and overpayment for disarmament.  Though he has been intimately involved in the amnesty — and thus he carries some of the burden of these shortcomings — he also has an opportunity to increase the chances of this program’s success under his leadership now.

Is Nigeria Really Going Nuclear?

The moderator, former ambassador Howard Jeter, also asked a thoughtful question about Nigeria’s leadership on foreign policy.  The easy answer, since Jonathan is in town after all for a nuclear summit, would have been to say that Africa is a nuclear free continent thanks to successful arms control (see Joe Cirincione’s excellent book on the history of nuclear weapons), and that Nigeria will exercise its leadership to keep it that way.  Instead, the Acting President’s talking points produced a meandering answer that included Nigeria’s interest in nuclear power (!), acknowledging the critical role of the IAEA of course.

What next for Nigeria, Mr. Acting President?  We await his public comments tomorrow.

April 13, 2010   Posted in: .  7 Comments

Nigeria’s Looming Constitutional Crisis

Leadership Vacuum
On January 27, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the foreign ministers of the EU, France, and the United Kingdom in a joint statement called upon Nigeria to “resolve the question of governing authority in the president’s prolonged absence,” since “Nigeria’s stability and democracy can carry great significance beyond its immediate borders.”  How does President Umar Yar’Adua absence from the country since November for medical reasons impact the politics of the Niger Delta?

Background:
Nigeria is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, with 5 percent of the world’s languages.  One of the strategies for managing this heterogeneity involves the division of the country into progressively smaller geopolitical units, starting with the division of the country into two “regions” (north and south) and then moving down to local government areas.  The practice of “power shift” mandates that the president and the vice president should come from different regions.  Though it is not codified in the constitution, it is deeply entrenched in political party procedures for picking the presidential candidate and widely accepted by the population as a federal bargain that helps stabilize the country and ensure that each major group gets its “turn” at politics.  This tradition in part accounts for the political unrest after the nullification of 1993 elections, when the presumed winner (M.K.O. Abiola) who came from the south was denied the presidency; it also accounts for the relatively peaceful transfer of political authority from one civilian politician to another in 2007 – for the first time in Nigeria’s democratic history.

Potential Problems of “Power Shift”
One disadvantage of power shift is that it effectively reduces the selectorate – the total number of candidates eligible for office.  This may not be such a problem in Nigeria though because the pool of eligible candidates is so large.  Another potential disadvantage is that such rotational formulas tend to harden or reinforce the identities whose interests they are designed to protect.  For example, this appears to be unfolding in Bosnia.  A major risk highlighted by the current leadership crisis in Nigeria is that it is unclear how long each group’s “turn” at power shift should last, and this is where the Niger Delta becomes relevant.

President Obasanjo, a southerner from the Yoruba ethnic group governed for two terms starting from the democratic transition in 1999.  (An illegal effort to permit him a third term was narrowly defeated by the National Assembly and civil society; see Posner and Young’s excellent piece on this in the Journal of Democracy in July 2007)  After President Yar’Adua emerged from the contentious and corrupt election of 2007, the power shift tradition led northerners to assume that it is their turn to rule for the next eight years…or at least for four years.  Since power shift also mandated that Yar’Adua’s vice president should come from the south, this means that if power is transferred to Vice President Goodluck Johnathan for any reason — including the president’s current serious illness — that the north would effectively be denied some length of its turn at the helm of the executive.

Power Shift and the Niger Delta:
Several factors increase the political risks: (1) Johnathan was selected as a VP running mate in part because he is from a core Niger Delta state.  The ruling People’s Democratic Party hoped that choosing himi would help alleviate the sense of political disenfranchisement which motivates the armed rebellions by MEND and other militant groups; (2) elites inside and outside of government are organizing to defend the north’s turn, and even exploring the possibility of holding another presidential elections for which there is no constitutional basis; (3) should the president become “permanently incapacitated” in the words of the Constitution (sections 144-146), and VP Johnathan is also somehow prevented from assuming the office, then authority could transfer to the next in line for presidential succession, Senate President David Mark.  Senator Mark was very close to Ibrahim Babangida, the dictator who ruled from 1985 through the annulled election of 1993 and a northerner who ran for president himself in 2003.

The President could have easily prevented the speculation surrounding his condition by making a clear public statement about his medical plans and then his condition.  Because he did not effect a temporary transfer of authority to the VP, there is a constitutional crisis unfolding.  Yesterday members of the House of Representatives moved to impeach the president, since it has not been possible to determine if the president’s medical condition warrants the VP assuming temporary authority.  Since public officials can be impeached for reasons of absence or negligence of duty, such an effort would not be constitutionally unfounded.  So far the cabinet (through the Federal Executive Council) has declined to vote by the required two thirds majority to determine if the president is capable of continuing in office.  The federal courts have complicated matters by effectively defending the status quo, rather than for example attempting to compel the cabinet to vote on the president’s competence which would trigger a process that would include an examination by a publicly appointed team of five doctors.

The joint statement by Secretary Clinton and others yesterday is an important step forward.  But it is also critical that the government and the Nigerian military be made aware that the US and its allies will not recognize a president who assumes office by extra-constitutional means.  And in the meantime, the perceived re-disenfranchisement of the Niger Delta peoples may drive militants back into the swamps, especially if the amnesty plan being offered right now starts to fall apart (see the excellent work by Judy Asuni at the United States Institute of Peace on this topic).

More to come soon…

January 28, 2010   Posted in: .  No Comments