Today I joined more than 50 of my African studies colleagues from the US, Europe, and Africa on a letter to US Secretary of State John Kerry¬†about the crisis in Burundi. We collectively ‚Äúurge the US government to apply all diplomatic and economic pressure to the Burundian government to swiftly and peacefully resolve the crisis.‚ÄĚ
Between 1962 and 1993, an estimated quarter of a million people died during a series of conflicts. (See for example, Filip Reyntjens, ‚ÄúConstitution-Making in Situations of Extreme Crisis: The Case of Rwanda and Burundi,‚ÄĚ in Journal of African Law, 1996.) The origins of the present crisis reside with President Pierre Nkurunziza‚Äôs plans to run for a third term in office, in violation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement that ended a violent civil war. There are a number of excellent articles about the Agreement and its power-sharing mechanisms, including Peter Uvin, ‚ÄúEthnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda,‚ÄĚ in Comparative Politics (1999), and ‚ÄúThe Internal Dynamics of Power-sharing in Africa,‚ÄĚ by Nic Cheeseman, in Democratization (2011).
There has been a rise in violence since a failed coup attempt in Bujumbura on May 13, and the country is at risk of slipping back into larger conflict. The president equated civilian protestors with coup supporters, whom he recently labeled ‚Äúinsurgents.‚ÄĚ According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, independent national media have been destroyed or shut down. As the professors‚Äô letter points out, ‚ÄúThis has raised fears among the population of political violence remaining unreported, especially in the interior of the country. Many civil society leaders, media figures, and those former government officials who have spoken out against the third term have either gone into hiding or have fled Burundi due to ongoing threats.‚ÄĚ
Equally worrisome, says the letter, is that the protest movement itself might radicalize in response to the government repression. The Imbonerakure, the youth movement of the ruling party, have escalated a campaign of intimidation, threatening to anybody who demonstrates against the third term, according to reports from the field. At least 110,000 people have fled Burundi to find refuge in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Tanzania. Not only does this increase the risk of regional instability, it also undermines the ethnic quota system integrated in to the Arusha Accord that has provided the basis for power-sharing. Click here to read the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees‚Äô strategy.
The plan of action endorsed by the signatories of the letter calls for the US to:
- continue its firm advocacy against President Nkurunziza’s third term;
- support the postponement of elections until they can be free and fair;
- suspend aid to any Burundian military units in violation of the Leahy Law
- consider appointing a Special Envoy, or ensuring the final appointment of the vacant Great Lakes Envoy position, to work with all parties to mediate a de-escalation of violence and maintenance of the Arusha Accords;
- consider targeted sanctions against the Burundian government to supplement the political pressure;
- support and encourage the deployment of the East African Standby Force (EASF) or another body willing to prevent or contain the eruption of mass killings if necessary.
For general background on the crisis, read the International Crisis Group‚Äôs May 29 report, ‚ÄúPeace Sacrificed?‚ÄĚ
The professors hope to meet with Secretary Kerry in the coming weeks to share their concerns and provide updates.¬† The complete list as of June 16 is below.
Cara E. Jones, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Mary Baldwin College
Katrin Wittig, PhD candidate in Political Science, University of Montreal
Beth Elise Whitaker, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Jessica Piombo, Associate Professor, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School
Kris Inman, Research Faculty, National Intelligence University
Alies Rijper, PhD candidate in International Affairs, Durham University
Stephanie Schwartz, PhD candidate in Political Science, Columbia University
Laura Seay, Assistant Professor of Government, Colby College
Rachel L. Ellett, Associate Professor of Political Science and Mouat Junior Professor of International Studies, Beloit College
Ryan Sheely, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard University
Rachel Strohm, PhD student in Political Science, University of California at Berkeley
Amy E. Harth, PhD student in Interdisciplinary Studies, Union Institute & University
Dominika Koter, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Colgate University
Jennifer Brass, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Indiana University
Cameron Wimpy, Researcher, Fors Marsh Group
Lyn S. Graybill, Independent Scholar
Nic Cheeseman, Associate Professor in African Politics, Oxford University
John Clark, Professor of International Relations, Florida International University
Amy Poteete, Associate Professor of Political Science, Concordia University
Adrienne LeBas, Assistant Professor, Department of Government, American University
Anne Pitcher, Professor of African Studies and Political Science, University of Michigan
Warigia Bowman, Assistant Professor, Clinton School of Public Service, University of Arkansas
Justin Schon, PhD Candidate in Political Science, Indiana University Bloomington
James R. Scarritt, Professor Emeritus, University of Colorado
Lahra Smith, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgetown University
Kim Yi Dionne, Five College Assistant Professor of Government, Smith College
Nelson Kasfir, Professor Emeritus of Government, Dartmouth College
David Throup, Professorial Lecturer, Johns Hopkins University and George Washington University, and Senior Associate, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Zoe Marks, Director of the MSc in African Studies Program and Co-Director of the Global Development Academy, University of Edinburgh
Robert Mortimer, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Haverford College
Fredline M‚ÄôCormack-Hale, Assistant Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Grant Gordon, PhD candidate in Political Science, Columbia University
Stephen Orvis, Associate Dean of Students for Academics and Professor of Government, Hamilton College
Carl LeVan, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University
Abangma James Arrey, Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Buea (Cameroon)
Lisa Ann Richey, Professor of International Development Studies, Roskilde University
Fodei J. Batty, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Quinnipiac University
Majuta Mamogale, PhD candidate, School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand
Timothy Longman, African Studies Center Director and Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Boston University
Milli Lake, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University
Ashley Leinweber, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Missouri State University
Barbara Lewis, Professor Emerita of Political Sciences, Rutgers University- New Brunswick
Megan Hershey, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Whitworth University
Hannah Britton, Associate Professor of Political Science and Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, University of Kansas
Karen Ferree, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California at San Diego
Keisha Haywood, Program Coordinator, Institute for Developing Nations, Emory University
Jacqueline Klopp, Associate Research Scholar, Center for Sustainable Urban Development, Columbia University
Henry Kam Kah, Faculty Member, Department of History, University of Buea (Cameroon)
Guy Grossman, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
Mamoudou Gazibo, Chair of the African Politics Conference Group and Professor of Political Science, University of Montreal
John Heilbrunn, Associate Professor of International Studies, The Colorado School of Mines
Michael Byron Nelson, Assistant Professor of Government, Wesleyan University
Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Peter E. Haas Faculty Co-Director of the Haas Center for Public Service, Stanford University
Midj√®ou T. Beranger Avohoueme, Consultant for the World Bank (Benin)
Lydia Apori Nkansah, Head of Department of Commercial Law, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (Ghana)
Arka Abota, Lecturer, Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia)
Devra C. Moehler, Assistant Professor, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania
Bruce A. Magnusson, Chair of Social Sciences and Associate Professor of Politics, Whitman College
Note: I participated in the National Democratic Institute’s Election Observation Mission, but the views contained here are strictly my own. Click here to read NDI’s preliminary report.
In a few weeks, Nigeria will swear in Muhammadu Buhari as president. The defeat of Africa’s largest political party, the People’s Democratic Party, will bring the All Progressives Congress (APC) into power after barely two years of organizing, mobilizing and coalition building. Buhari will enter office with a strong mandate from the voters, having won four out of the country’s six geopolitical zones, and the APC will enjoy a comfortable majority in the Senate. Though a northern Muslim from Katsina, his support included the predominantly Yoruba southwest, where President Goodluck Jonathan recent delivered bags of cash to traditional rulers according to news reports¬†and where the militant Odudwa Peoples’ Congress launched a wave of thuggery in recent weeks. Even before the results were announced, voters in the north reacted with jubilation, and militant groups including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta began surreptitiously re-arming in the creeks of the south. Sources I met with over the¬†weekend in Rivers State say they have seen caches of weapons in camps backed by militants such Ateke Tom and others.
Buhari has a mandate, and his most urgent challenge is to neither misinterpret nor abuse it. According to an Afrobarometer poll released 23 March, 40% of Nigerians say the president “should be allowed to govern freely without wasting time to justify expenses,” and 25% say the president should “pass laws without worrying about what the National Assembly thinks.” 68% are “not very” or “not at all” satisfied with the way democracy is working.
The last time Nigeria elected a former dictator, Obasano in 1999, he spent his first term battling the National Assembly and quelling violence in the region that largely voted against him. But he also began building institutions, and establishing trust with his skeptics. The last time Nigerians had Buhari at the helm, the jubilation quickly gave way to frustration, repression, and economic failure. I detail the episode in my book,¬†Dictators and Democracy in African Development: the Political Economy of Good Governance in Africa.
With the Mandate Comes a Tough Mission
Buhari’s “honeymoon” will therefore be critical, and probably even shorter lived than his memories of 1984. He will need to do more than make grand rhetorical gestures to democracy; he’ll need to practice it and educate his own supporters about¬†the advantages of the justice and fairness it offers, even where the cost may be the kind of efficiency the Afrobarometer respondents appear to be longing for.¬†How could Buhari repair bridges and capitalize on this fleeting moment of opportunity?
(1) Go south – this would send a valuable message to northerners that he is everyone’s president. This trip could also include a clear transition plan or policy for the status of the ongoing amnesty program for the Niger Delta militants, who need reassurance that they do not need an Ijaw president in order to have “resource control” taken seriously, or to have environmental cleanup and developmental needs addressed. The sooner and more clearly they hear this message, the less likely will be the the re-ignition of the Delta rebellions.
This is also important because in a country partly divided along religious lines between north and south, Afrobarometer reports that trust in religious leaders at 29% is higher than the National Assembly, governors, local governments, or even traditional rulers (16%). International observation missions and civil society groups repeatedly expressed concern about the new and dangerous religious discourse in the 2015 campaign; Christian Igbos in the east (who overwhelmingly rejected the APC) and minorities in the south need to know they can trust Buhari, and he needs their cooperation to govern peacefully and practically.
(2) “Reset” national security strategy – this may include replacing key members of the national security establishment. While some continuity may help preserve institutionalized knowledge, particularly with regard to the recent “surge” against Boko haram, the mishandling of the Chibok girls’ kidnapping reduced confidence in the national security team, and the pressure applied to the electoral commission prior to the election delay has contributed to the perception that some soldiers and many advisers are partisan.
Additional steps could include establishing a new, civilian liaison unit with victims and IDPs with adequate resources and an accountable mechanism for receiving private voluntary donations from around the world. During the campaign, Buhari also pledged strong commitment to women; he could live up to that quickly by committing new resources to the generation of girls (and boys) — hundreds of thousands — who are displaced and not in school because of the insurgency.
Boko Harm has been displaced (hence the recent attacks in Gombe State) but not defeated. This means a credible counter-insurgency strategy is needed, including (a) sustained high-level interactions with the multinational coalition partners, and a repairing of bridges to the US, UK, and other allies with a stake in Nigeria’s peaceful prosperity; (b) permitting increased access to the region by the foreign and domestic press; (c) the termination of any agreements with private security contractors working in the northeast; (d) a serious commitment to non-military components to encourage defection of Boko Haram and to re-build the northeast.
When Obasanjo arrived in 1999, he embarked on a massive military reshuffling and retirement campaign. IF such steps are deemed necessary to restore confidence in the military, they could be linked to corruption investigations and human rights accountability. Security sector reform is a¬†sleeping giant of the 2015 campaign.
Why was Rivers State such a hot battleground in the 2015 elections?
Read my paper prepared for the Western Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting, April 2.
(3) Visit the United States and the United Kingdom as soon as practicable – In both countries, Buhari will be greeted by a diaspora that was frustrated with the PDP, but that needs reassurance he will listen to their concerns as Nigerians, especially where southerners in the diaspora have had the loudest voices. This will be important in the US, where leadership in Congress has interpreted Boko Haram as a war against Christians, rather than a complex insurgency with many different victims and deep historical and socio-economic roots. Buhari has an unprecedented opportunity to recast the Muslim face of Africa at a time when violent terrorist movements have both perverted Islam and distorted Western foreign policies meant to be more multifaceted.
(4) Wake up the somnambulant EFCC – Anti-corruption investigations helped get Nigeria’s economy back on track during Obasanjo’s tenure and raised confidence in politicians and institutions. What have the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission been up to lately? Nobody knows. Under competent leadership with sufficient resources, a high profile and clear independence, foreign investors would be reassured and citizens would disassociate Buhari’s War on Indiscipline (in 1983-84) from his commitment to clean, democratic politics.
(5) Pick a credible, competent and diverse economic team – In early 2014, the government of Nigeria (along with the World Bank and others) highlighted trends in economic diversification. The near crisis triggered by the decline in oil prices since then suggests either these claims were overstated or much more work needs to be done. Buhari could reform the refinery and oil importation mechanisms, commit to publishing all of the federal governments revenue transfers to subnational units each month (like it used to), and pick a combination of experts from academia, the private sector, and the bureaucracy to get the economy back on track. A few obvious steps would go a long way: Reaffirm the independence of the Central Bank (whose governor was replaced last year), stabilize the currency, and consult the National Assembly about budget plans and fiscal crises.
The rest is up to the Nigerian people, who spoke on March 28. Voting was just the beginning.
More to come.
Government demolitions have displaced hundreds of thousands of people in Abuja, Nigeria‚Äôs Federal¬†Capital Territory since the early 2000s. While this is neither unusual in Nigeria nor in Africa more generally, Abuja is the fastest growing city in West Africa and its unusual property laws and the potential for ¬†unrest warrant¬†greater scholarly attention. In ¬†“I am Here Until Development Comes: Displacement, Demolitions and Property Rights in Urbanising Abuja,” published in African Affairs (July 2014), anthropologist Josiah Olubowale and I argue that this housing insecurity is not simply the result of urbanization, population growth, or wealth disparities. We attribute it instead to a property rights
regime that perpetuates discrimination by providing special land rights for the area‚Äôs early inhabitants. We also show how, as indigenes have been short-changed by policies to relocate and compensate them, their interests have aligned more closely with migrants seeking improved housing security. By pursuing the shared goal of housing rights for migrants and indigenes alike, new coalitions — both within particular slums and across them — have helped defuse tensions that could otherwise be conducive to conflict.
We describe the origins of Abuja in the post-civil war policies of Nigeria‚Äôs military regimes, which sought to both integrate the nation and insulate the government from popular pressure centered in the coastal city of Lagos. Next, we integrate research from urban studies with literature on civil society, property rights, and civil conflict. This multi-faceted perspective sheds light on the persistence of a seemingly inefficient (and arguably unjust) land law, and demonstrates why the cooperation we documented runs counter to common expectations in social conflict research. We then describe how various governments adopted policies that generate incentives for indigenes to refuse resettlement, and to profit from
migrants. What can residents do to protect their rights? We describe residents‚Äô strategic repertoire for responding to housing demolitions and the rise of new housing rights networks based on an alignment of interests between indigenes and migrants. Tenants and many indigenous landlords have come to share a common narrative of victimhood stemming from Abuja‚Äôs housing laws. We conclude that insecure tenancy gives Abuja‚Äôs poor no incentive to improve properties and note with concern the role of large estate developers. In the words of indigenous activists, ‚ÄėWhen development comes‚Äô it brings displacement and disempowerment.
Before Boko Haram entered the media spotlight, there was the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and militant groups from Nigeria’s oil rich region who took hostages, sabotaged oil rigs, and attacked government installations. Since 2009, most of their members have been part of an amnesty process attempting to re-integrate them into society. ¬†But the groups still have a strong underground presence. ¬†Here’s the full text of MEND’s statement on the missing girls of Chibok, issued at noon today (Nigeria time) and signed at the bottom by its leader:
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) condemns in the strongest terms the abduction of over 200 school girls by the Boko Haram group.
We join all well-meaning Nigerians and the International Community in demanding for their immediate and safe release.
Amnesty International Report
The recent revelation from credible security sources of the advance warning given to the Nigerian military but failing to act, as revealed by Amnesty International, is a clear indication of the incompetence, corruption and systematic failure that has also plagued the Nigerian military.
Rather than investigating these callous act and show of shame by the Nigerian military, the government of Goodluck Jonathan and the Army are busy denying the report by Amnesty International.
The Nigerian government have been slow in accepting help from the United States and other Western countries due to their attempt to cover up their ill-equipped and corrupt military, incapable of matching the firepower of the Boko Haram group.
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) once again uses this medium to call on the National Assembly to rise up to their responsibilities to the nation and launch a probe into the Defence budget and make Nigerians understand how the military can justify their lack of military resources against the huge Defence budget allocated to the Defence Ministry each year.
With the denial by the Nigerian military, the world should ask, is this the same military that earlier lied to the world that they had rescued the abducted girls?
We have constantly warned Nigerians about Goodluck Jonathan and his train of sycophants running the country. Events of the last few weeks have vindicated our position on the inability of this man to lead Nigeria anywhere but downwards. Rather than address serious issues facing the nation and its citizens, Goodluck Jonathan, bereft of ideas and encouraging mass division in the country, is busy squandering public funds and throwing money at every visible problem with no clear long term vision towards a sustainable polity, while his train of sycophants continue to use their ‚Äúanti-Jonathan‚ÄĚ rhetorics in their defence. Furthermore, every level of his government appears to be engineered towards his re-election in 2015 as was seen by the world barely 48 hours after the recent bomb blast in Nyanya, Abuja.
With each passing day, the inept, corrupt and incompetent Goodluck Jonathan sadly confirms the bitter truth that a man that was not even capable of leading a State is obviously not Presidential material, will never be and thus hardening the determination on the part of decent Nigerian society to get rid of him as quickly as possible. Goodluck Jonathan is disgustingly corrupt, has always been one and his association and shielding of corrupt government officials, coupled with his ungodly desperation and criminal-cum-undemocratic tendencies has made him a primary enemy of Nigeria and Nigerians today.
Kidnaped and Freed Dutch Nationals
The same group that was involved in the kidnap of President Jonathan‚Äôs adopted father was responsible for the recent abduction of the three (3) Dutch nationals.
We welcome their decision to finaly release their hostages as adviced by MEND as they had nothing to do with or connections with any of the multi national oil companies operating in the Niger Delta region.
This group adviced that although their primary motivation was for ransom, they also wanted to use the kidnap to highlight the insecurity which still exists in the Niger Delta region and also their disgust, like MEND, with the fraudulent Niger Delta Amnesty Programme which has only made billionaires of a few thugs, at the detriment of millions of impoverished indigenes and the peace and security in the region.
In the words of Professor Wole Soyinka, ‚ÄúThis is a government that is not only in denial mentally, but in denial about certain steps to take‚ÄĚ and ‚ÄúAll the pretence, indifference and denial have ended‚ÄĚ.
Some of the most interesting and practical suggestions sprouting up from the grassroots have not been making their way into the broader discussions about finding Nigeria‚Äôs missing girls.¬† Here are some ideas threaded together, based on my daily conversations with civil society organizations, government officials, and international solidarity activists.
There is already a larger conversation about medium and long term strategies, including a good overview in the recent International Crisis Group report on Boko Haram. Perhaps the most comprehensive ‚Äď and consistently ignored ‚Äď list of suggestions came from the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in 2012. The U.S. Institute of Peace has also recently engaged the northern governors on how to move forward, and provided them with a politically neutral ground for discussion.¬† Future publications or blogs of mine will discuss those solutions.¬† This post explores more immediate political and administrative steps that would matter right now:
(1) Establish ‚Äúsolidarity schools‚ÄĚ in the north ‚Äď Even before ‚ÄúWestern education‚ÄĚ was under attack, Northeastern Nigeria had some of the lowest levels of literacy and school enrollments in the country.¬† Families have to take such huge risks to send their girls to school, and the security services have yet to figure out how to protect educational institutions. While waiting for a return to normalcy and security, thousands of children are being denied education.
Existing schools in nearby states could temporarily absorb some of these girls. By volunteering to do so, these schools and communities would make a statement of national solidarity ‚Äď building trust across regional and ethnic lines.¬† States such as Kano might be especially well poised to do so, because it already has some accommodation for Islamic education in its curriculum that would be appealing to Muslim families. To absorb the costs, arrange the logistics and create a buffer against politicization of the effort, organizations such as the Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria¬†(FOMWAN), JDPC, Innovative Initiative for Peace, ¬†or Women Environmental Programme (WEP) could lead the effort and receive private donations.¬† This would also give a channel for Bill and Melinda Gates, Aliko Dangote, Mo Ibrahim, Ted Turner, Angelina Jolie, Francois-Henri Pinault ‚Äď and ordinary citizens like you and me to donate to something concrete (sorry, that sounds like a pun since I mentioned Dangote) and from the grassroots.¬† Of course, the ‚Äúschools‚ÄĚ would have to be temporary, and a reintegration back home following the end of the insurgency should be the goal.¬† And by involving organizations like FOMWAN, the effort would undermine the insurgents‚Äô attacks on girls‚Äô education itself.
As a step towards a broader reform of federal laws and policies pertaining to citizenship, the government could state that the girls and their families will be treated as ‚Äúcitizens of Nigeria‚ÄĚ in these other states, pulling down longstanding distinctions between ‚Äúsettler‚ÄĚ and indigene at the heart of so much violence in Plateau State, Benue, and Taraba.
(2) Officially acknowledge IDPs and refugees as a widespread problem, and ask for assistance ‚Äď When the elephants fight, the grass suffers.¬† Tens of thousands of Nigerians have been displaced by Boko Haram and military‚Äôs heavy handed response to it.¬† Nigerians who have fled to Niger and elsewhere need urgent humanitarian assistance, public support, and a plan for reintegration into Nigerian society.¬† In line with recommendations from the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) two years ago, Nigeria‚Äôs National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) need to ensure that the necessary legal and policy frameworks are in place to secure the rights of IDPs and refugees.¬† Then the administration could publicly outline the scale of the problem and describe¬†steps being taken to help affected families — without assigning blame. The NEMA and NCFR could then formally request assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, USAID, or other appropriate international organizations.¬† It could invite the Red Cross or another neutral humanitarian organization to help.
The military could provide a humanitarian corridor for donations. To reduce corruption and diversion of relief supplies, permit monitors from the National Human Rights Commission and civil society coalitions such as the Transition Monitoring Group, which already has experience training and deploying tens of thousands of election monitors.¬† There are barely 1,000 km of paved roads in Borno State according to the most recent available statistics. Get food and medical supplies to the people.
(3) Invite more women to run for political office ‚Äď Nigeria is mobilizing for national and state elections in February 2015. As I document in my chapter on Nigeria in the undergraduate textbook Comparative Politics Today, women‚Äôs representation in the National Assembly has actually declined in the last few election cycles.¬† Political parties such as the ruling People‚Äôs Democratic Party, the All Progressives Congress, and others could issue public statements urging women to run for office and inviting voters to participate in transparent, competitive primary processes. The¬†Electoral Reform Network and other civil society organizations could help monitor women’s access to primaries, and promote the call to run.
4) Hold a press conference every day ‚Äď When Ministry of Defence officials said that the girls had been rescued when in fact they had not, this created a credibility gap. Finding the girls and ending the insurgency will require a regular opportunity to correct erroneous information and for the government to justify the information it provides. The citizens of Nigeria deserve to know the facts; and if there are certain issues on which the facts are not clear, such a forum would provide a reliable and official place for such information to be sorted out.
National Security Adviser Dasuki could do a daily press brief every day streamed live.¬† Modeled after other such briefings in crisis situations, accredited journalists could ask questions for the world to hear. From time to time, the NSA could bring in other officials with different relevant roles: education policy (see #1), refugee support, international cooperation, and others.
(5) A meeting between President Jonathan and the families of the missing girls ‚Äď in private and without the eyes and ears of the media.¬† Let him hear their concerns, feel their frustration, and earn their trust. ¬†Then, in collaboration with groups such as the Nigerian Bar Association,¬†Legal Awareness for Nigerian Women (LEADS), or Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) secure them pro bono legal representation.¬† This will help protect the privacy of the girls if their families so desire, and also ensure that their rights are protected during debriefings with the security services and the incoming international teams, who need information about the girls’ captors if they are going to do their job effectively.
(6) Foreign governments ‚Äď could commit to robust democratic oversight of any assistance.¬† If security assistance becomes part of the solution, the US, UK, and other governments must invite and welcome legislative oversight and civil society scrutiny. Such international help must comply with relevant human rights laws and promote the rule of law in Nigeria.¬† It also should not become trapped in partisan domestic politics.
Revisions forthcoming as we learn from each other, share ideas,
and mutually commit to the safety and education of girls.