Government demolitions have displaced hundreds of thousands of people in Abuja, Nigeria‚Äôs Federal¬†Capital Territory since the early 2000s. While this is neither unusual in Nigeria nor in Africa more generally, Abuja is the fastest growing city in West Africa and its unusual property laws and the potential for ¬†unrest warrant¬†greater scholarly attention. In ¬†“I am Here Until Development Comes: Displacement, Demolitions and Property Rights in Urbanising Abuja,” published in African Affairs (July 2014), anthropologist Josiah Olubowale and I argue that this housing insecurity is not simply the result of urbanization, population growth, or wealth disparities. We attribute it instead to a property rights
regime that perpetuates discrimination by providing special land rights for the area‚Äôs early inhabitants. We also show how, as indigenes have been short-changed by policies to relocate and compensate them, their interests have aligned more closely with migrants seeking improved housing security. By pursuing the shared goal of housing rights for migrants and indigenes alike, new coalitions — both within particular slums and across them — have helped defuse tensions that could otherwise be conducive to conflict.
We describe the origins of Abuja in the post-civil war policies of Nigeria‚Äôs military regimes, which sought to both integrate the nation and insulate the government from popular pressure centered in the coastal city of Lagos. Next, we integrate research from urban studies with literature on civil society, property rights, and civil conflict. This multi-faceted perspective sheds light on the persistence of a seemingly inefficient (and arguably unjust) land law, and demonstrates why the cooperation we documented runs counter to common expectations in social conflict research. We then describe how various governments adopted policies that generate incentives for indigenes to refuse resettlement, and to profit from
migrants. What can residents do to protect their rights? We describe residents‚Äô strategic repertoire for responding to housing demolitions and the rise of new housing rights networks based on an alignment of interests between indigenes and migrants. Tenants and many indigenous landlords have come to share a common narrative of victimhood stemming from Abuja‚Äôs housing laws. We conclude that insecure tenancy gives Abuja‚Äôs poor no incentive to improve properties and note with concern the role of large estate developers. In the words of indigenous activists, ‚ÄėWhen development comes‚Äô it brings displacement and disempowerment.
Before Boko Haram entered the media spotlight, there was the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and militant groups from Nigeria’s oil rich region who took hostages, sabotaged oil rigs, and attacked government installations. Since 2009, most of their members have been part of an amnesty process attempting to re-integrate them into society. ¬†But the groups still have a strong underground presence. ¬†Here’s the full text of MEND’s statement on the missing girls of Chibok, issued at noon today (Nigeria time) and signed at the bottom by its leader:
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) condemns in the strongest terms the abduction of over 200 school girls by the Boko Haram group.
We join all well-meaning Nigerians and the International Community in demanding for their immediate and safe release.
Amnesty International Report
The recent revelation from credible security sources of the advance warning given to the Nigerian military but failing to act, as revealed by Amnesty International, is a clear indication of the incompetence, corruption and systematic failure that has also plagued the Nigerian military.
Rather than investigating these callous act and show of shame by the Nigerian military, the government of Goodluck Jonathan and the Army are busy denying the report by Amnesty International.
The Nigerian government have been slow in accepting help from the United States and other Western countries due to their attempt to cover up their ill-equipped and corrupt military, incapable of matching the firepower of the Boko Haram group.
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) once again uses this medium to call on the National Assembly to rise up to their responsibilities to the nation and launch a probe into the Defence budget and make Nigerians understand how the military can justify their lack of military resources against the huge Defence budget allocated to the Defence Ministry each year.
With the denial by the Nigerian military, the world should ask, is this the same military that earlier lied to the world that they had rescued the abducted girls?
We have constantly warned Nigerians about Goodluck Jonathan and his train of sycophants running the country. Events of the last few weeks have vindicated our position on the inability of this man to lead Nigeria anywhere but downwards. Rather than address serious issues facing the nation and its citizens, Goodluck Jonathan, bereft of ideas and encouraging mass division in the country, is busy squandering public funds and throwing money at every visible problem with no clear long term vision towards a sustainable polity, while his train of sycophants continue to use their ‚Äúanti-Jonathan‚ÄĚ rhetorics in their defence. Furthermore, every level of his government appears to be engineered towards his re-election in 2015 as was seen by the world barely 48 hours after the recent bomb blast in Nyanya, Abuja.
With each passing day, the inept, corrupt and incompetent Goodluck Jonathan sadly confirms the bitter truth that a man that was not even capable of leading a State is obviously not Presidential material, will never be and thus hardening the determination on the part of decent Nigerian society to get rid of him as quickly as possible. Goodluck Jonathan is disgustingly corrupt, has always been one and his association and shielding of corrupt government officials, coupled with his ungodly desperation and criminal-cum-undemocratic tendencies has made him a primary enemy of Nigeria and Nigerians today.
Kidnaped and Freed Dutch Nationals
The same group that was involved in the kidnap of President Jonathan‚Äôs adopted father was responsible for the recent abduction of the three (3) Dutch nationals.
We welcome their decision to finaly release their hostages as adviced by MEND as they had nothing to do with or connections with any of the multi national oil companies operating in the Niger Delta region.
This group adviced that although their primary motivation was for ransom, they also wanted to use the kidnap to highlight the insecurity which still exists in the Niger Delta region and also their disgust, like MEND, with the fraudulent Niger Delta Amnesty Programme which has only made billionaires of a few thugs, at the detriment of millions of impoverished indigenes and the peace and security in the region.
In the words of Professor Wole Soyinka, ‚ÄúThis is a government that is not only in denial mentally, but in denial about certain steps to take‚ÄĚ and ‚ÄúAll the pretence, indifference and denial have ended‚ÄĚ.
Some of the most interesting and practical suggestions sprouting up from the grassroots have not been making their way into the broader discussions about finding Nigeria‚Äôs missing girls.¬† Here are some ideas threaded together, based on my daily conversations with civil society organizations, government officials, and international solidarity activists.
There is already a larger conversation about medium and long term strategies, including a good overview in the recent International Crisis Group report on Boko Haram. Perhaps the most comprehensive ‚Äď and consistently ignored ‚Äď list of suggestions came from the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in 2012. The U.S. Institute of Peace has also recently engaged the northern governors on how to move forward, and provided them with a politically neutral ground for discussion.¬† Future publications or blogs of mine will discuss those solutions.¬† This post explores more immediate political and administrative steps that would matter right now:
(1) Establish ‚Äúsolidarity schools‚ÄĚ in the north ‚Äď Even before ‚ÄúWestern education‚ÄĚ was under attack, Northeastern Nigeria had some of the lowest levels of literacy and school enrollments in the country.¬† Families have to take such huge risks to send their girls to school, and the security services have yet to figure out how to protect educational institutions. While waiting for a return to normalcy and security, thousands of children are being denied education.
Existing schools in nearby states could temporarily absorb some of these girls. By volunteering to do so, these schools and communities would make a statement of national solidarity ‚Äď building trust across regional and ethnic lines.¬† States such as Kano might be especially well poised to do so, because it already has some accommodation for Islamic education in its curriculum that would be appealing to Muslim families. To absorb the costs, arrange the logistics and create a buffer against politicization of the effort, organizations such as the Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria¬†(FOMWAN), JDPC, Innovative Initiative for Peace, ¬†or Women Environmental Programme (WEP) could lead the effort and receive private donations.¬† This would also give a channel for Bill and Melinda Gates, Aliko Dangote, Mo Ibrahim, Ted Turner, Angelina Jolie, Francois-Henri Pinault ‚Äď and ordinary citizens like you and me to donate to something concrete (sorry, that sounds like a pun since I mentioned Dangote) and from the grassroots.¬† Of course, the ‚Äúschools‚ÄĚ would have to be temporary, and a reintegration back home following the end of the insurgency should be the goal.¬† And by involving organizations like FOMWAN, the effort would undermine the insurgents‚Äô attacks on girls‚Äô education itself.
As a step towards a broader reform of federal laws and policies pertaining to citizenship, the government could state that the girls and their families will be treated as ‚Äúcitizens of Nigeria‚ÄĚ in these other states, pulling down longstanding distinctions between ‚Äúsettler‚ÄĚ and indigene at the heart of so much violence in Plateau State, Benue, and Taraba.
(2) Officially acknowledge IDPs and refugees as a widespread problem, and ask for assistance ‚Äď When the elephants fight, the grass suffers.¬† Tens of thousands of Nigerians have been displaced by Boko Haram and military‚Äôs heavy handed response to it.¬† Nigerians who have fled to Niger and elsewhere need urgent humanitarian assistance, public support, and a plan for reintegration into Nigerian society.¬† In line with recommendations from the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) two years ago, Nigeria‚Äôs National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) need to ensure that the necessary legal and policy frameworks are in place to secure the rights of IDPs and refugees.¬† Then the administration could publicly outline the scale of the problem and describe¬†steps being taken to help affected families — without assigning blame. The NEMA and NCFR could then formally request assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, USAID, or other appropriate international organizations.¬† It could invite the Red Cross or another neutral humanitarian organization to help.
The military could provide a humanitarian corridor for donations. To reduce corruption and diversion of relief supplies, permit monitors from the National Human Rights Commission and civil society coalitions such as the Transition Monitoring Group, which already has experience training and deploying tens of thousands of election monitors.¬† There are barely 1,000 km of paved roads in Borno State according to the most recent available statistics. Get food and medical supplies to the people.
(3) Invite more women to run for political office ‚Äď Nigeria is mobilizing for national and state elections in February 2015. As I document in my chapter on Nigeria in the undergraduate textbook Comparative Politics Today, women‚Äôs representation in the National Assembly has actually declined in the last few election cycles.¬† Political parties such as the ruling People‚Äôs Democratic Party, the All Progressives Congress, and others could issue public statements urging women to run for office and inviting voters to participate in transparent, competitive primary processes. The¬†Electoral Reform Network and other civil society organizations could help monitor women’s access to primaries, and promote the call to run.
4) Hold a press conference every day ‚Äď When Ministry of Defence officials said that the girls had been rescued when in fact they had not, this created a credibility gap. Finding the girls and ending the insurgency will require a regular opportunity to correct erroneous information and for the government to justify the information it provides. The citizens of Nigeria deserve to know the facts; and if there are certain issues on which the facts are not clear, such a forum would provide a reliable and official place for such information to be sorted out.
National Security Adviser Dasuki could do a daily press brief every day streamed live.¬† Modeled after other such briefings in crisis situations, accredited journalists could ask questions for the world to hear. From time to time, the NSA could bring in other officials with different relevant roles: education policy (see #1), refugee support, international cooperation, and others.
(5) A meeting between President Jonathan and the families of the missing girls ‚Äď in private and without the eyes and ears of the media.¬† Let him hear their concerns, feel their frustration, and earn their trust. ¬†Then, in collaboration with groups such as the Nigerian Bar Association,¬†Legal Awareness for Nigerian Women (LEADS), or Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) secure them pro bono legal representation.¬† This will help protect the privacy of the girls if their families so desire, and also ensure that their rights are protected during debriefings with the security services and the incoming international teams, who need information about the girls’ captors if they are going to do their job effectively.
(6) Foreign governments ‚Äď could commit to robust democratic oversight of any assistance.¬† If security assistance becomes part of the solution, the US, UK, and other governments must invite and welcome legislative oversight and civil society scrutiny. Such international help must comply with relevant human rights laws and promote the rule of law in Nigeria.¬† It also should not become trapped in partisan domestic politics.
Revisions forthcoming as we learn from each other, share ideas,
and mutually commit to the safety and education of girls.
Next year, 24 out of Nigeria‚Äôs 36 governors will be term limited. This is the fifth election cycle since the 1999 transition, and as in 2007, the last time a large group of governor faced term limits, this is shifting attention to the primaries. As noted in my posts analyzing the 2010 Electoral Act, the law mandates primaries ‚Äď or at least open caucuses ‚Äď though in 2011 this requirement was loosely interpreted and weakly enforced. Three factors that will shape this seismic change in Nigeria‚Äôs states are local governments, the fluctuating influence of so-called ‚Äúgodfathers,‚ÄĚ and subnational implementation of ‚Äúpower shift,” an information institution that rotates power based on geographical areas.
Eleven states now have caretaker local government committees, where Local Government Area (LGA) chairs or entire committees have been removed. There is no provision in the constitution permitting this, though the PDP under Obasanjo took similar steps in 2003. The states have significant control over LGAs under the constitution, since money for local governments passes through state coffers. Thus LGAs are contested areas for either the party structures at the center to circumvent the governors, or for governors to fortify themselves against national encroachment.
‚ÄúGodfathers‚ÄĚ are an important factor intervening between these national and local political structures. They pour money and clout into political campaigns. For example, Anambra some years ago fell into disarray when Governor Chris Ngige had a falling out with his godfather. A few members of the state‚Äôs delegation to the National Assembly had to fight costly, high profile court battles simply to run for re-election. In Oyo State, where I used to live, godfather Chief Lamidi Adedibu engineered the impeachment of Governor Rashidi Ladoju.
But it is not clear that the godfathers hold the same sway they did in the 2003 or 2007 elections. Adams Oshiomole, the former labor leader who is now governor of Edo State, where I visited in 2011, has generated a great deal of autonomy. He has done this partly by focusing on his state, rather than emphasizing his national profile. There is also some evidence that the legendary Abubakar Olusola Saraki in Kwara State has lost influence. Though he just openly commissioned a massive retirement mansion for himself in Ilorin, with public funds and lots of praise, others question his influence today. This is discussed in an excellent but often overlooked book, Nigeria’s Critical Election, 2011, edited by John Ayoade and Adeoye Akinsanya (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013). They also point out that Saraki told a news magazine in 2011 that he ‚Äúdoes not believe in conducting primaries but negotiation and talking to people to see reason why some political offices should be given out to certain persons.‚ÄĚ
This kind of meddling is precisely what is driving some pushback. In Akwa Ibom a few PDP senators and elders’ groups (See The Nation, 16 April 2014) insist that primaries should really be open. They are angry that PDP party leadership is trying to ‚Äúimpose‚ÄĚ candidates. It remains to be seen whether the new and long delayed Electoral Act will fully empower voters to do so, and whether the Independent National Electoral Commission will further advance this critical reform ‚Äď or more importantly administratively enforce it.
Local Pushback against power shift
For its part, power shift ¬†may have inspired much of the frustration within the PDP, a big tent party. According to my interview with the spokesperson for ‚ÄúNew PDP,‚ÄĚ the self-described PDP faction that joined the recently formed APC, this informal rule eliminates eligible (and often qualified) politicians from the pool of candidates. Rivers State for example is deeply divided over the question of whether upland ethnic groups, or riverine groups from the south, should rule; the current governor is from the upland region. Southern Ogonis insist it is their ‚Äúturn,‚ÄĚ while eastern Ijaws [who are otherwise mostly in neighboring Bayelsa State] are also upset.
The question has potential (though still remote) implications for the state of amnesty for Niger Delta militant groups in place since 2009. Asari Dokubu, leader of the banned militant group Niger Delta People‚Äôs Volunteer Force, caused ripples recently by insinuating that the group would not allow Nyseom Wike, current Federal Minister of Education, to become governor in 2015. Wike is an ethnic Ikwerre, and the First Lady, Patience Jonathan, has waded into politics in her home city by throwing her weight behind him. Following complaints in the press that she was interfering in Rivers State politics, she declared ‚ÄúWike is the leader of PDP in Rivers State,‚ÄĚ and effectively confirming the allegations, said ‚ÄúThe First Lady is solidly behind Wike.‚ÄĚ
The question is, Who are the voters going to get behind?
Governor Amaechi also deployed a clever political tool last week with his unexpected announcement that River State
is abolishing ‚Äúindigene/settler‚ÄĚ distinctions. Though it is a larger constitutional question of citizenship, beyond the scope of a governor‚Äôs powers, his announcement has a broader political effect by sending the message that his state will not permit discrimination against people who migrated there. An experiment in federalism at work.
Much of the attention on Nigeria‚Äôs preparations for its national, state, and local elections scheduled for 2015 has centered on administrative reforms, technological innovations, and the law. This post aims to compliment such analysis by focusing on two themes shaping the political climate, drawing in particular on my research trip to Rivers State and Abuja. Future posts will touch upon the state of ‚Äúgodfathers‚ÄĚ in the states, and explore emerging campaign issues and other themes.
Center / periphery tensions
Unlike previous elections, training for the security services has begun in advance. Typically concerns have centered on preventing violence, but it is not clear how well the curriculum addresses the potential politicization of the police, which had been less of a concern following the 1999 transition than many observers feared. But last year in Rivers State, the police commissioner Mbu was fired for being openly partisan. Journalists and sources told me how police would show up at one rally to break it up and at another to protect the protesters. Governor Amaechi told me police still not free of partisanship, and he
supports state-level police ‚Äď an issue before the national ‚Äúconfab.‚ÄĚ The police have barred members of the Rivers House of Assembly from entering their legislative chamber (see photo). The state Assembly is therefore meeting off sight in an old building, and after a full on fist fight on the floor last year over the parliamentary mace, when five People‚Äôs Democratic Party (PDP) stalwarts attempted to convene the 32 seat Assembly, the Speaker is closely guarding the parliamentary mace.
Resources have been a recurring axis of state/center tensions for decades, and there have been some important shifts there too. The Speaker of the Ekiti State House recently said that even where state legislatures are productive, and government is not divided between different parties, dependence on the executive for funding is a problem (see ‚ÄúState Assemblies Need Financial Autonomy,‚ÄĚ TELL, 21 April 2014). Rather than doing hearings, they conduct oversight through three ‚Äúparlays‚ÄĚ per year, where the assembly tells Governor Kayode Fayemi (an opposition governor) their findings. This dependence on the center actually shows great variation, as discussed by Dr. Funmbi Elemo in her excellent chapter in my book in progress, co-edited with Dr. Joseph Fashagba.
Under Nigeria‚Äôs elaborate revenue allocation system, states are statutorily entitled to a share of federal funds determined by a formula and administered by the Federal Revenue Allocation Commission. The point of the Commission is to depoliticize the distribution of oil revenues that accrue to the center. But the ruling PDP argues that states‚Äô entitlement is not absolute. The National Assembly‚Äôs Hon. Austin Opara told me, ‚ÄúWhere there is crisis, the revenues are kept in escrow account.‚ÄĚ Withholding the funds has had not only the obvious political effect of infuriating opposition governors, it is also leading Governor Amaechi and others to borrow money from commercial banks, thus creating new debts during a time of national surplus which could soon cloud the rosy picture of the economy being painted by the Minister of Finance. After oil prices dropped in 1980, governors in Nigeria‚Äôs Second Republic also took out large loans (See The Rise and Fall of Nigeria’s Second Republic, 1979-84, by Toyin Falola and Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere‚Äôs.)
The characterization by Hon. Opara (and other PDP politicians I spoke with) of political instability in Rivers also demonstrates how the ruling party believes it possesses significant discretionary authority since the laws governing revenue allocation do not permit the establishment of such escrow accounts, which can be used as a lever in opposition-controlled states. If such withholding is not politically motivated, then in my ongoing research I expect to identify evidence that PDP strongholds face similar budget constraints. And how will the budgets in other opposition states fare? The formal states of emergency in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa expires soon, but it will almost certainly be re-extended.
Debating the Laws of Decampment
There is a long tradition, going back to the First Republic, of party leaders accusing elected politicians of ‚Äúanti-party activities.‚ÄĚ This was common during Obasanjo‚Äôs first term as well. The emergence of the All Progressive Congress (APC), however, for now presents a viable alternative for members whose ambitions are frustrated by the national PDP‚Äôs efforts to control candidate selection. Moreover, the mass defections raise doubts about the efficacy of suspensions as tools for promoting party loyalty, according to senior APC politicians. A decline in disciplinary effectiveness could deepen desperation in the PDP.
Rivers State has emerged as a symbol for these issues. The tipping point was last year when the PDP replaced the governor‚Äôs close ally in the state party leadership, Ake, with a loyalist of current Minister of Education, Nyesom Wike. Not long after, the governor and the Rivers House of Assembly attempted to remove the Local Government Area chair and council members in Obio-Akpor. Since this is Wike‚Äôs home LGA, it became a much larger symbol of the contest between PDP and APC. But it is also of interest because it suggests first, how the three tiers of federalism multiply the possible interactions between local and national political structures. The Rivers governor is withholding funds for the LGA ‚Äď much like the PDP is withholding funds for Rivers State.
Second, this is also of interest because of the role the courts have played. Election observers have routinely looked to the courts as a saving grace in Nigeria‚Äôs elections, by serving as a conflict resolution mechanism in disputes over who won particular elections, Buhari‚Äôs decision to take his protest to the judiciary rather than the streets in 2011 being the most prominent example out of hundreds of cases. In River State, the courts have upheld the chairmanship of Prince Timothy Nsirim in Obio-Akpor (click here to read the court judgement), but the APC in Rivers says they are appealing the decision which you can download here, and therefore do not recognize him. In other words, control over the Rivers State Assembly and this key LGA remains contested, with two sides in each instance claiming legitimate leadership. Rather than resolving the issue decisively, the courts are stuck in an argument that will draw out for months or even years.
Similarly, a court in Abuja ruled that the ‚ÄúNew PDP‚ÄĚ is not a faction. If it stands could effectively nullify the constitutional basis for forming the APC. Naturally, the APC is appealing. The key point is that the courts are likely to be much more involved in internal party politics than in previous elections, subjecting them to increased political pressure, and signaling that the Electoral Act for the 2015 elections will need to take careful preventative steps to promote both judicial neutrality and efficiency. The bill‚Äôs language on independent candidates will be critical not only because facilitating independent candidates could split opposition supporters and play into the hands of the PDP, but because it could increase politicians‚Äô autonomy by allowing them to circumvent requirements for party factions.