Nigeria’s Transformation through Representation and Revenue

Panel discussion during the American Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting
Friday, August 31, 2012 at 2:00
Nottoway room of the Sheraton New Orleans

Just months before Nigeria’s 1999 transition, Eghosa Osaghae published his seminal book, Crippled Giant, and reference to the title became a common was of introducing the politics and economics of Africa’s most populous country.  Since then, Nigeria has grappled with guerrilla rebellions in the oil producing south, violent Islamic militants in the north, stolen elections, and widespread corruption.  However Nigeria has also witnessed checks on executive excesses, increased economic diversification, improved macroeconomic performance, and some effective conflict resolution across multiple levels of politics.  What do the institutional, cultural or structural features of Nigerian government performance tell us about broader comparative trends in Africa’s emerging democracies?

On Friday, August 31, I will chair a panel discussion entitled “Crippled Giant No More? Nigeria’s Transformation through Representation and Revenue,” sponsored by the APSA’s Committee on International Political Science that will explore this question at a panel during the Annual Meeting in New Orleans. The panel’s papers examine how subnational variance in revenue collection speaks to different types of citizen-government linkages, and how reforms in the legislature and within political parties have opened new avenues of political accountability.  Recurring debates over the appropriations have often slowed the policy process, but they has also enhanced civil society participation and promoted legislative capacity building.  Efforts to address religious conflicts through property rights reforms and enhanced civil rights enforcement show some promise.  Representational dilemmas at the core of these conflicts have also brought into the open popular demands to reconcile power-sharing traditions which operate at different levels of formality and at different tiers of Nigeria’s complex federal system.

A new generation of scholars on the panel will explore these varied outcomes through key concepts and themes of comparative political institutions, drawing upon innovative field research and trans-Atlantic collaboration facilitated in part by APSA’s Africa Workshops.  The papers engage literatures on comparative democratization and politics in the developing world in several ways.  The research on corruption and post-transition economic performance joins a reinvigorated debate among Africanists about the ability of policy choice to overcome adverse structural conditions, including colonial legacies (Ndulu, O’Connell, Bates, 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson 2010).  The endogenous emergence of local power-sharing traditions has important implications for conflict resolution and comparative federalism (Reynolds 2011; Rothchild and Roeder 2005).  In particular the recent strengthening of governors through statutory revenue allocations raises important questions about fiscal federalism’s relationship to subnational political authority (Suberu 2001; Lijphart 1999).  Two of the papers engage the literature on comparative legislatures, debating whether Nigeria’s National Assembly has advanced democratic consolidation by promoting accountability — or held it back by enabling clientism and corruption. If Nigeria was a “crippled giant” in the words of Osaghae’s famous book, domestic drivers of political and economic change suggest it is now healing.

Here is information about the papers and panelists, three of whom are veterans of the APSA’s Africa Workshops:

“The Flourishing of Religion and Violence: Explaining the Volatility of Religion, Identity, and Politics in Nigeria”
Laura Thaut, University of Minnesota, Department of Political Science
Despite undergoing recent democratic transitions, a number of countries in the global South have been beset by inter-religious communal violence over the last four decades, hindering political stability and socio-economic development (e.g., Duffy-Toft 2006; Fox 2004;). Concurrent with this trend, religious change has swept through the global South. Although Islam has grown rapidly in some countries, the change of recent decades is largely due to the rapid growth of Christianity (e.g., Shah 2009; Marshall 2009; Johnson and Chung 2004, 171; Jenkins 2002, 2-3; Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson 2001, 5; Berger 1999; Gill 2002; Esposito 1998). Current scholarship, however, largely overlooks the importance of religious change in the construction of group identities or cleavages and in the contestation for representation in political institutions. The puzzle is this: Why does inter-religious violence occur in some religiously and ethnically mixed communities and not others with similar dynamics? Under what conditions does religious identity – as opposed to other ethnic identities – become the fault-line of communal violence and the salient mobilizing narrative even if the “root” of the conflict is not religious ideas or beliefs? In Nigeria, for example, Muslim-Christian violence has surged since the 1980s, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives, displacement, and destruction of property.  However, Muslim-Christian violence does not break out everywhere. What are the political mechanisms that result in endemic communal violence as opposed to relative peace among religious groups?

To address this puzzle, my paper draws together the literature on representation and ethnic conflict, examining the relationship between ethnic/tribal representation in local government institutions – degree of power-sharing – and a community’s vulnerability to inter-religious conflict. Recent scholarship questions the ability of power-sharing to ameliorate ethnic cleavages and conflict, and finds little empirical evidence of its effectiveness (LeVan 2011; Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Cheeseman and Tendi 2010; Lijphart 2002; Oyugi 1999); but the power-sharing scholarship has largely focused on formal national-level institutions. In my research, I reformulate this theory to test whether informal power-sharing among ethnic/tribal groups in local level government helps to explain the sub-national variation in inter-religious violence. From nearly a year of fieldwork in northern Nigeria, my paper presents the findings of both qualitative case study research and quantitative data gathering work, including the construction of an original dataset of communal violence in northern Nigeria from 1979-2011 and data collected on “sub-state/province” local government election results. Based on these data, I find support for my theory that religious change in Nigeria has introduced a powerful narrative of group identity and difference that, depending on informal local power-sharing arrangements, can be leveraged for violence or peacebuilding. Furthermore, I show how inter-religious violence has become a more frequent phenomenon since the end of the 1970s, and I discuss the importance of distinguishing between the precipitating events and mechanisms that spark ethnic/tribal versus inter- or ethno-religious communal violence.

“The Nigerian Legislature and Socio-political Re-Engineering in the Fourth Republic”
Joseph Olayinka Fashagba, Landmark University, Nigeria
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has been struggling to develop economically and efforts to stabilize democratic government have been futile.  Although Nigeria inherited a parliamentary democracy at independence and experimented with the presidential system in the second republic, both republics collapsed due to stress and strain, implying that institutional reforms matters little.  The intervention of the military in governance became a major feature of the polity until 1999 when democracy was once again restored.  While military rule lasted, political participation was stifled, the national economy was grossly mismanaged, and civil society was severely emasculated.  This study identifies specific historical factors which have impacted participation and economic policy planning during the Fourth Republic.  Comparative studies focus on the role of the legislature in consolidating democracy broadly (Barkan 2009; Fish 2008) or enhancing accountability (Bryan and Hofmann 2007; Stapenhurst 2008).  However less research has been done on the role of African legislatures in setting the economic policy agenda or in widening the scope of public participation in politics.  Using original data from secondary sources including newspapers and government reports, this paper argues that the legislature has not only broadened participatory politics but also helped to kick start Nigeria’s economy through various acts enacted after the restoration of democracy.  Advancing this policy agenda required the vigorous participation of civil society, and it also enhanced legislative capacity as the National Assembly gained technical experience in its negotiations with the executive branch over economic policy.

 “Corruption in High Places: Is the National Assembly Endangering Nigeria’s Democratic Project?”
Yahaya T. Baba, Political Science Department, Faculty of Social Sciences
Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Nigeria
Democratic governance lodges the power to rule in the hands of the people, enabling them to hold officials in high places accountable for corruption. Accountability in its vertical and horizontal forms is promoted by relatively autonomous institutions (O’Donnell, 1999; Smullovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000).  The legislature is especially central to controlling the conduct and behavior of officials through its roles of law making, oversight, and representation (Barkan, 2005, 2009, Nijzink, et. al 2006). Thus strong legislatures are necessary for a robust democracy.  Nigeria’s National Assembly since its inception in 1999 has been grappling with crises relating to autonomy, capacity, and political patronage (Lewis, 2009; Jibrin, 2004).  This affects its ability to supervise and control government. This paper argues that corruption both within the National Assembly and in the presidency are a consequence of a weak legislature. An entrenched culture of executive dominance, low capacity of personnel due to inexperience and high turnover, and clientelism are some of factors contributing to weak capacity. In this sense the National Assembly resembles other emerging legislatures (Barkan et. al, 2004, Stapenhurst, 2004; Barkan 2005; Nijzink, 2005).  Nigeria’s legislators do deserve credit for successfully provoking probes and sanctioning corruption internally, but their capacity to engender broader public accountability across executive agencies is comparably weak.   What explains the partial success of the National Assembly to stem internal corruption on one hand, and its failure to engender broader public accountability across governmental agencies on the other hand?  What have been the instrumental and reactionary roles of the executive to corruption episodes in the National Assembly? Why have various probes by the National Assembly into some executive agencies (power, health, privatization, and education) failed to systematically improve public accountability?  A key reason stems from the abuse of power by the executive since the inception of democracy in 1999, which has undermined the autonomy and capacity of the National Assembly.  Corruption episodes in the National Assembly are often engineered by the executive to displace disloyal assertive leadership as a strategy to keep the legislature weak. Primary and secondary source data suggest that the executive has responded to legislative probes by protecting friendly members accused of corruption and instigating the probes of unfriendly members. This often visibly divides the National Assembly along patronage and nationalistic lines. The paper concludes that inadequate public interest is also responsible for the failure to induce horizontal checks against executive corruption, a viewpoint gauged against the backdrop of varying levels of public support enjoyed by the National Assembly in recent years.

“Taxation and Representation in Contemporary Africa: Determinants of Local and State Budgeting Priorities”
Olufunmbi M. Elemo, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University
Under what conditions are African local and state governments more likely to spend public revenues on public service delivery? Local and state governments, increasingly important to the execution of African democracy, serve as a mechanism for participatory integration people into the fold of governance. In order to facilitate the execution of their growing duties, local and state legislatures are endowed with the power to raise revenue. Given these varied obligations, what determines local and state government spending priorities?

Scholars have continuously linked the development of representative institutions to citizen taxation. Originating in studies of Western Europe, theory suggests, in order to raise revenue for war/border protection, rulers enter into a contract with citizens: citizens agree to provide tax revenue in exchange for an enhanced role in governance. With taxation comes the incentive for political leaders to shift public policy and spending toward citizen interests (Tilly1985/1990; Bates and Lien, 1985; Levi, 1988; North and Weingast, 1989; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). In an application of this theory to Africa, Gibson and Hoffman (2005) find that in Tanzania and Zambia, local governments deriving a larger portion of their revenue from citizen taxation are also more likely to spend revenue on public service delivery, and less likely to spend income on recurrent expenditures (e.g. government salaries).

I attempt to further test the applicability of this theory to Africa, focusing on the Nigerian case, where interactions between income from citizen taxation and petroleum create varied sub- national revenue compositions. Using 1999– 2009 budgetary data collected from the Central Bank of Nigeria during fieldwork (October 2010 – July 2011), I test the Gibson and Hoffman hypothesis, not only at the local government level, but also state government level. I expect a positive relationship between tax dependence and public service delivery (in both local and state governments) and a negative relationship between non-tax based sources of revenue (federal transfers from petroleum and value added tax, grants/foreign aid) and expenditures on public services. Utilizing random effects Generalized Least Squares models, analysis confirms that as revenue from taxation increases, both local and state government spending on public service provision increases.  A relationship between taxation and representative government suggests that building the local and state governments’ tax administrative capacity can also bolster responsive and democratic governance.

Congratulations in advance to these four scholars!
Please join us for a robust discussion about the recent past — and the near future — of Nigeria.
Carl LeVan, American University, School of International Service

You can watch my Voice of America interview here:

I am also quoted in the Reuters article by Mark Hosenball and John Shiffman, “U.S. debates ‘terrorist’ sanctions for Nigerian militants” published on May 25, 2012.

For useful background on Boko Haram, I would encourage you to read the 2012 report published by the U.S. Institute of Peace, “What is Boko Haram?”  The Council on Foreign Relations also has a good backgrounder written by Toni Johnson in 2011.   Former Ambassador John Campbell from CFR regularly follows related issues on his blog too.

The violence across northern Nigeria during the last several years has highlighted the deep frustrations over broken promises for development, the potential for homegrown militancy to spread, and the role of impunity in cultivating widespread cynicism toward the security forces.  With all the attention the radical Islamist group Boko Haram has received recently, it has become hard to keep the spotlight on the Niger Delta, where activists have been agitating on those same three issues for many years.  Thus the suspicious and arbitrary detention of Rev. David Ugolor, a prominent civil society leader in the Niger Delta, deserves more attention as it has already sent chills throughout grassroots organizations  in Nigeria’s oil producing region.

Background

Last month, Olaitan Oyerinde, a top official for Edo State Governor Adams Oshiomhole (the former labor leader), was murdered during a robbery of his home.  When the police then arrested several men, one of them described his sponsor and said his name was “David.”  Six suspects who confessed to the crime have since been paraded on national television.  But this has done little to establish some semblance of due process for Rev. David Ugolor, who was arrested on July 27 in the offices of the African Network for Environment and Economic Justice (ANEEJ).

According to an August 4 statement from ANEEJ, at least ten police officers ransacked Ugolor’s home and the organization’s offices, preventing staff from making any phone calls while officials seized materials over the course of three hours.  His mistreatment and ongoing arbitrary detention has precipitated an outcry from civil society organizations, and demands from Governor Oshiomhole for a federal probe into police mishandling of the case.  As the governor explained to The Nation newspaper on August 18, confessions to the same crime by other suspects, and conflicting information by the security services, cast doubt on the entire process.  He further described Ugolor as “unarguably the most prominent civil society activist in Edo State and a well-known friend of Comrade Olaitan Oyerinde.”  In other words, Ugolor had no motive.

Ugolor founded ANEEJ in 1995 and went on to campaign for debt cancellation, helping to set up the Jubilee South Forum that included members from 35 poor countries around the world.  According to a biography prepared by Benin City journalist Michael Odigbe, he received funding from the Heinrich Boell Foundation, the British High Commission, and the Norwegian government for his work on monitoring oil revenue transfers and spending in the Niger Delta, which in part led to the creation of the Niger Delta Budget Monitoring and Transparency Network.  With ANEEJ, he has also been at the forefront of the debate over the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) – which I have analyzed previously on the Development4Security blog – arguing for institutionalizing a role for civil society participation.  Most recently, and perhaps most sensitively, he also led civil society calls for implementation of the recommendations of Lawan probe into s fuel subsidy corruption.

It is worth recalling that the head of that House of Representatives sanctioned investigation, Hon. Farouk Lawan from Kano State, faced allegations that his committee had accepted bribes (after disclosing that he had inappropriately been offered bribes) in exchange for watering down their report.  Will other proponents of oil revenue transparency and accountability suffer similar fates?  An excellent editorial in yesterday’s issue of Leadership asked why neither the House Ethics Committee nor the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has made progress on answering whether bribes were offered, solicited, or received.

Either Charge Rev. Ugolor — or Release Him

Publish What You Pay Nigeria called for Ugolor’s “immediate and unconditional release,” arguing in a recent press release that he “is being framed for his activism in revenue transparency and brining reforms to bear on the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry.”  On August 9, 23 civil society organizations, including the Ijaw Youth Council, the Women Environmental Programme, and numerous Edo-state based youth organizations praised Ugolor’s leadership on the PIB, election monitoring in the recent gubernatorial elections.  From 1999 to 2005 Ugolor was also a tireless advocate for the Recovery of Stolen Assets legislation (from 1999-2005), which helped the Nigerian government retrieve millions of dollars stolen by the family of the late dictator Sani Abacha – but which earned Ugolor numerous enemies.  The groups are now calling on President Goodluck Jonathan to create a commission to investigate the mishandling of the case, and to determine who Oyerinde’s killers really are.

An even longer list of 150 civil society organizations and leaders, from all six of the country’s geopolitical zones, signed an open letter on August 15, asking the police to either formally charge Ugolor – or release him in accordance with his constitutional rights.  (Editor’s Note: some organizations are accidentally listed twice in the original letter.)  Expressing concern about the chilling effect his detention is having on political rights, the signatories call “on governments at all levels in Nigeria to protect the space for those advancing progressive, liberal ideas by strengthening the civil society space.”

So far, the international community unfortunately hasn’t taken much notice.  ANEEJ wrote a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton just a few days before her August 10 meeting with President Jonathan.  But Boko Haram, cooperation on the US-Nigeria Bilateral Commission, and other issues appear to have dominated the discussion.  Ugolor’s colleagues at

A State Department photo of the Clinton and Jonathan meeting on August 9.

ANEEJ are waiting to hear back from the American diplomats.  The story has been all over the Nigerian press, with reports in Vanguard and other outlets covering the activists’ frustration with the police.  In contravention of constitutional guarantees to a speedy trial, Ugolor has yet to formally be charged with a crime.  This led High Court Judge Esther A. Edigin on August 16 to order his release on medical grounds, rather than on bail.  Another hearing will take place later this week.

I will post updates on the case here, and you can also follow the issues by joining the new Facebook group.  Oyerinde’s family deserves justice, and Nigerians deserve to know the truth about this murky murder, which offers yet another clear test for how committed the Jonathan administration really is to the rule of law.

The US Ambassador to Kenya resigned yesterday, following criticism of his management of the embassy and in advance of an internal government audit to be released soon.  Details are discussed in today’s New York Times.  The post’s vacancy comes at a fragile time in bilateral relations, as Kenya prepares for elections which once again raise the possibility of violence.  A recent report by the Friends Committee on National Legislation provides an excellent overview of some of the major issues concerning the election preparations. Troops from Kenya and Uganda have made progress against al-Shabaab in southern Somalia, and the group remains a top concern for the US and regional African leaders.  In light of these concerns, a group of scholars and policy experts have released the following statement on the vacancy and urging a swift replacement.

STATEMENT ON THE RESIGNATION OF U.S. AMBASSADOR TO KENYA, SCOTT GRATION

Akwe Amosu, Director of Africa Advocacy, Open Society Foundations

Joel D. Barkan, Senior Associate, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies and co-chair of the Kenya Working Group

Bronwyn Bruton, Deputy Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, The Atlantic Council

Jennifer Cooke, Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Richard Downie, Deputy Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Jeremy Konyndyk, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Mercy Corps

Tom Malinowski, Washington Director, Human Rights Watch

Sarah Margon, Associate Director, sustainable Security and Peace Building, Center for American Progress  Action Fund and co-chair of the Kenya Working Group

Steve McDonald, Director, Africa Program, Woodrow International Center for Scholars

J. Peter Pham, Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, The Atlantic Council

Sarah Pray, Senior Policy Analyst, Open Society Foundations

Cassidy Regan, Kenya Program Associate, Friends Committee on National Legislation

David Throup, Senior Associate, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

The individuals listed above are members of the Kenya Working Group (KWG).   Their institutional affiliations are listed for identification only, and do not represent any official position of these organizations.

THE KENYA WORKING GROUP

The Kenya Working Group, co-chaired by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and the Center for American Progress (CAP), is a nonpartisan forum for policy experts who seek to encourage a robust U.S. policy towards Kenya in the run up to and after the 2013 national elections in order to prevent violence and help support a successful democratic transition. Kenya has made important progress addressing many of the issues that enabled the 2007 electoral violence but much work remains. Similarly, the U.S. government has a vital support role to play, particularly by working closely with Kenyans and other key actors. The Kenya Working Group meets regularly to share information, generate policy recommendations, and support a constructive and active U.S. policy towards Kenya.

US Profs to Clinton: Respond to Boko Haram with Diplomacy, Development, and Demilitarization

Twenty-one scholars with expertise on Nigeria sent a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton today on Boko Haram.  The letter begins by noting the “horrific violence” perpetrated against civilians and government officials, but argues that responding to Boko Haram ultimately requires a “diplomatic, developmental, and demilitarized framework.”  You can download the full text of the letter to Clinton.

Nigeria’s National Security Advisor is visiting Washington, D.C. this week, and Secretary Clinton has been under pressure from Republicans in the House of Representatives to formally designate Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).  The Department of Justice’s National Security Division wrote a letter to Clinton in January, also urging her to make the designation.

The US-based academics, however, argue that formally labeling Boko Haram an FTO would “limit American policy options to those least likely to work.”  In particular, it would:

(1) Internationalize Boko Haram’s standing and enhance its status among radical organizations elsewhere.  A report by Homeland Security Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives in November was entitled, “Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the US Homeland,” and John Brennan, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, said in a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center on April 30 that Boko Haram “appears to be aligning itself with al-Qaida’s violent agenda and is increasingly looking to attack Western interests in Nigeria, in addition to Nigerian government targets.”  Many scholars however suggest that despite claims by members of the group, and some alleged contact with terrorist organizations outside Nigeria, Boko Haram overwhelmingly remains a domestic problem.

(2) Give disproportionate attention to counter-terrorism in bilateral relations at a time when economic ties are expanding and a robust multi-faceted relationship has emerged.  Last month the U.S. Special Operations Command organized a three day conference on Boko Haram, which entailed a detailed discussion about possible next steps.  Some government civilians saw this as an effort to make policy – rather than simply implement it.  This was a marked contrast with comments by AFRICOM four years ago, when it repeatedly reassured its critics that it would “stay in its lane.”  The signers of the letter argue, “The State Department and its civilian developmental partners must be in the lead” on Nigeria policy.

(3) Undermine Nigeria’s progress on the rule of law in two ways: First, by effectively legitimizing abuses by security services that Human Rights Watch and other organizations have drawn attention to as urgent, ongoing problems.  This issue is especially important because the extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram’s captured leader by the police in 2009 was immediately followed by an expansion of violence, radicalization, and fragmentation of Boko Haram. Second, President Goodluck Jonathan is pushing the National Assembly for Martial Law.  Historically, such measures have been followed by broader political instability.  It would give the military an expanded role in law enforcement in a country with a deep history of authoritarianism. Moreover, given the contentious nature of Jonathan’s ascent to power in 2010, and his election in 2011 despite the informal PDP understanding that it was the North’s “turn” to rule, additional executive latitude would likely be interpreted as a desperate attempt by a southerner to hold on to power.

(4) Impede humanitarian assistance and possibly independent academic research.  The scholars note that the national security list system has created a “cumbersome and arbitrary process” that has interfered with humanitarian work in Africa.  The Charity and Security Network has documented how provisions of the Patriot Act prevented humanitarian assistance from reaching hungry people during last summer’s famine in east Africa, for example.  In a new report entitled “Deadly Combination: Disaster Conflict and the U.S. Material Support Law,” CSN notes that once an organization is listed as an FTO, the US Treasury Department explicitly prohibits “any transactions” with listed groups or other entities described as their supporters.

For this reason, the academics in the letter raise the concern that the FTO’s broad legal regime could also impact their ability to conduct independent scholarly inquiry.

An excellent report from the Center for American Progress summarizes the legal consequences of an FTO designation, and points out how numerous terrorist organizations are not designated as such because of the cumbersome problems that it generates for humanitarianism and balanced inter-agency policy making.

The FTO designation would likely have devastating effects on remittances from Nigerian-Americans.  According to the World Bank, Nigeria was the highest recipient of remittance flows to Africa in 2011.  It received an estimated $10.6 billion, amounting to 4.5% of Nigeria’s GDP.  Thousands of Nigerian-Americans would therefore fear prosecution for sending money home.  And at a time when the US is trying to demonstrate its goodwill in the north, families there in particular would face additional burdens and hardships.  Click here to see a chart prepared by the Migration Policy Institute tracking Nigeria’s remittances over time.

I was one of the letter’s initiators, along with Peter Lewis from SAIS and Jean Herskovits from SUNY – Purchase.  I will be giving a brief talk on Boko Haram at a conference sponsored by the Jamestown Foundation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Tuesday, June 19, in Washington, DC.  I hope to see some of you there.