Some of the most interesting and practical suggestions sprouting up from the grassroots have not been making their way into the broader discussions about finding Nigeria’s missing girls.  Here are some ideas threaded together, based on my daily conversations with civil society organizations, government officials, and international solidarity activists.

There is already a larger conversation about medium and long term strategies, including a good overview in the recent International Crisis Group report on Boko Haram. Perhaps the most comprehensive – and consistently ignored – list of suggestions came from the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in 2012. The U.S. Institute of Peace has also recently engaged the northern governors on how to move forward, and provided them with a politically neutral ground for discussion.  Future publications or blogs of mine will discuss those solutions.  This post explores more immediate political and administrative steps that would matter right now:

(1) Establish “solidarity schools” in the north – Even before “Western education” was under attack, Northeastern Nigeria had some of the lowest levels of literacy and school enrollments in the country.  Families have to take such huge risks to send their girls to school, and the security services have yet to figure out how to protect educational institutions. While waiting for a return to normalcy and security, thousands of children are being denied education.

A school in Adamawa, one of the states affected by the rebellion. I took this photo in 2008.

Existing schools in nearby states could temporarily absorb some of these girls. By volunteering to do so, these schools and communities would make a statement of national solidarity – building trust across regional and ethnic lines.  States such as Kano might be especially well poised to do so, because it already has some accommodation for Islamic education in its curriculum that would be appealing to Muslim families. To absorb the costs, arrange the logistics and create a buffer against politicization of the effort, organizations such as the Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN), JDPC, Innovative Initiative for Peace,  or Women Environmental Programme (WEP) could lead the effort and receive private donations.  This would also give a channel for Bill and Melinda Gates, Aliko Dangote, Mo Ibrahim, Ted Turner, Angelina Jolie, Francois-Henri Pinault – and ordinary citizens like you and me to donate to something concrete (sorry, that sounds like a pun since I mentioned Dangote) and from the grassroots.  Of course, the “schools” would have to be temporary, and a reintegration back home following the end of the insurgency should be the goal.  And by involving organizations like FOMWAN, the effort would undermine the insurgents’ attacks on girls’ education itself.

As a step towards a broader reform of federal laws and policies pertaining to citizenship, the government could state that the girls and their families will be treated as “citizens of Nigeria” in these other states, pulling down longstanding distinctions between “settler” and indigene at the heart of so much violence in Plateau State, Benue, and Taraba.

(2) Officially acknowledge IDPs and refugees as a widespread problem, and ask for assistance – When the elephants fight, the grass suffers.  Tens of thousands of Nigerians have been displaced by Boko Haram and military’s heavy handed response to it.  Nigerians who have fled to Niger and elsewhere need urgent humanitarian assistance, public support, and a plan for reintegration into Nigerian society.  In line with recommendations from the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) two years ago, Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) need to ensure that the necessary legal and policy frameworks are in place to secure the rights of IDPs and refugees.  Then the administration could publicly outline the scale of the problem and describe steps being taken to help affected families — without assigning blame. The NEMA and NCFR could then formally request assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, USAID, or other appropriate international organizations.  It could invite the Red Cross or another neutral humanitarian organization to help.

The military could provide a humanitarian corridor for donations. To reduce corruption and diversion of relief supplies, permit monitors from the National Human Rights Commission and civil society coalitions such as the Transition Monitoring Group, which already has experience training and deploying tens of thousands of election monitors.  There are barely 1,000 km of paved roads in Borno State according to the most recent available statistics. Get food and medical supplies to the people.

(3) Invite more women to run for political office – Nigeria is mobilizing for national and state elections in February 2015. As I document in my chapter on Nigeria in the undergraduate textbook Comparative Politics Today, women’s representation in the National Assembly has actually declined in the last few election cycles.  Political parties such as the ruling People’s Democratic Party, the All Progressives Congress, and others could issue public statements urging women to run for office and inviting voters to participate in transparent, competitive primary processes. The Electoral Reform Network and other civil society organizations could help monitor women’s access to primaries, and promote the call to run.

4) Hold a press conference every day – When Ministry of Defence officials said that the girls had been rescued when in fact they had not, this created a credibility gap. Finding the girls and ending the insurgency will require a regular opportunity to correct erroneous information and for the government to justify the information it provides. The citizens of Nigeria deserve to know the facts; and if there are certain issues on which the facts are not clear, such a forum would provide a reliable and official place for such information to be sorted out.

National Security Adviser Dasuki could do a daily press brief every day streamed live.  Modeled after other such briefings in crisis situations, accredited journalists could ask questions for the world to hear. From time to time, the NSA could bring in other officials with different relevant roles: education policy (see #1), refugee support, international cooperation, and others.

(5) A meeting between President Jonathan and the families of the missing girls – in private and without the eyes and ears of the media.  Let him hear their concerns, feel their frustration, and earn their trust.  Then, in collaboration with groups such as the Nigerian Bar Association, Legal Awareness for Nigerian Women (LEADS), or Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) secure them pro bono legal representation.  This will help protect the privacy of the girls if their families so desire, and also ensure that their rights are protected during debriefings with the security services and the incoming international teams, who need information about the girls’ captors if they are going to do their job effectively.

(6) Foreign governments – could commit to robust democratic oversight of any assistance.  If security assistance becomes part of the solution, the US, UK, and other governments must invite and welcome legislative oversight and civil society scrutiny. Such international help must comply with relevant human rights laws and promote the rule of law in Nigeria.  It also should not become trapped in partisan domestic politics.

Revisions forthcoming as we learn from each other, share ideas,

and mutually commit to the safety and education of girls.

Next year, 24 out of Nigeria’s 36 governors will be term limited. This is the fifth election cycle since the 1999 transition, and as in 2007, the last time a large group of governor faced term limits, this is shifting attention to the primaries. As noted in my posts analyzing the 2010 Electoral Act, the law mandates primaries – or at least open caucuses – though in 2011 this requirement was loosely interpreted and weakly enforced. Three factors that will shape this seismic change in Nigeria’s states are local governments, the fluctuating influence of so-called “godfathers,” and subnational implementation of “power shift,” an information institution that rotates power based on geographical areas.

Eleven states now have caretaker local government committees, where Local Government Area (LGA) chairs or entire committees have been removed. There is no provision in the constitution permitting this, though the PDP under Obasanjo took similar steps in 2003. The states have significant control over LGAs under the constitution, since money for local governments passes through state coffers. Thus LGAs are contested areas for either the party structures at the center to circumvent the governors, or for governors to fortify themselves against national encroachment.

“Godfathers” are an important factor intervening between these national and local political structures. They pour money and clout into political campaigns. For example, Anambra some years ago fell into disarray when Governor Chris Ngige had a falling out with his godfather. A few members of the state’s delegation to the National Assembly had to fight costly, high profile court battles simply to run for re-election. In Oyo State, where I used to live, godfather Chief Lamidi Adedibu engineered the impeachment of Governor Rashidi Ladoju.

But it is not clear that the godfathers hold the same sway they did in the 2003 or 2007 elections. Adams Oshiomole, the former labor leader who is now governor of Edo State, where I visited in 2011, has generated a great deal of autonomy. He has done this partly by focusing on his state, rather than emphasizing his national profile. There is also some evidence that the legendary Abubakar Olusola Saraki in Kwara State has lost influence. Though he just openly commissioned a massive retirement mansion for himself in Ilorin, with public funds and lots of praise, others question his influence today. This is discussed in an excellent but often overlooked book, Nigeria’s Critical Election, 2011, edited by John Ayoade and Adeoye Akinsanya (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013). They also point out that Saraki told a news magazine in 2011 that he “does not believe in conducting primaries but negotiation and talking to people to see reason why some political offices should be given out to certain persons.”

This kind of meddling is precisely what is driving some pushback. In Akwa Ibom a few PDP senators and elders’ groups (See The Nation, 16 April 2014) insist that primaries should really be open. They are angry that PDP party leadership is trying to “impose” candidates. It remains to be seen whether the new and long delayed Electoral Act will fully empower voters to do so, and whether the Independent National Electoral Commission will further advance this critical reform – or more importantly administratively enforce it.

Local Pushback against power shift

For its part, power shift  may have inspired much of the frustration within the PDP, a big tent party. According to my interview with the spokesperson for “New PDP,” the self-described PDP faction that joined the recently formed APC, this informal rule eliminates eligible (and often qualified) politicians from the pool of candidates. Rivers State for example is deeply divided over the question of whether upland ethnic groups, or riverine groups from the south, should rule; the current governor is from the upland region. Southern Ogonis insist it is their “turn,” while eastern Ijaws [who are otherwise mostly in neighboring Bayelsa State] are also upset.

The question has potential (though still remote) implications for the state of amnesty for Niger Delta militant groups in place since 2009. Asari Dokubu, leader of the banned militant group Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, caused ripples recently by insinuating that the group would not allow Nyseom Wike, current Federal Minister of Education, to become governor in 2015. Wike is an ethnic Ikwerre, and the First Lady, Patience Jonathan, has waded into politics in her home city by throwing her weight behind him. Following complaints in the press that she was interfering in Rivers State politics, she declared “Wike is the leader of PDP in Rivers State,” and effectively confirming the allegations, said “The First Lady is solidly behind Wike.”

The question is, Who are the voters going to get behind?

A rally in Port Harcourt, supporting the governor’s announcement on the indigene/settler distinction.

Governor Amaechi also deployed a clever political tool last week with his unexpected announcement that River State
is abolishing “indigene/settler” distinctions. Though it is a larger constitutional question of citizenship, beyond the scope of a governor’s powers, his announcement has a broader political effect by sending the message that his state will not permit discrimination against people who migrated there. An experiment in federalism at work.

Much of the attention on Nigeria’s preparations for its national, state, and local elections scheduled for 2015 has centered on administrative reforms, technological innovations, and the law. This post aims to compliment such analysis by focusing on two themes shaping the political climate, drawing in particular on my research trip to Rivers State and Abuja. Future posts will touch upon the state of “godfathers” in the states, and explore emerging campaign issues and other themes.

Center / periphery tensions

Unlike previous elections, training for the security services has begun in advance. Typically concerns have centered on preventing violence, but it is not clear how well the curriculum addresses the potential politicization of the police, which had been less of a concern following the 1999 transition than many observers feared. But last year in Rivers State, the police commissioner Mbu was fired for being openly partisan. Journalists and sources told me how police would show up at one rally to break it up and at another to protect the protesters. Governor Amaechi told me police still not free of partisanship, and he

The Police, who are controlled by the Federal Government, have barred the Rivers State Assembly from meeting in its chambers for six months.

supports state-level police – an issue before the national “confab.” The police have barred members of the Rivers House of Assembly from entering their legislative chamber (see photo). The state Assembly is therefore meeting off sight in an old building, and after a full on fist fight on the floor last year over the parliamentary mace, when five People’s Democratic Party (PDP) stalwarts attempted to convene the 32 seat Assembly, the Speaker is closely guarding the parliamentary mace.

Resources have been a recurring axis of state/center tensions for decades, and there have been some important shifts there too. The Speaker of the Ekiti State House recently said that even where state legislatures are productive, and government is not divided between different parties, dependence on the executive for funding is a problem (see “State Assemblies Need Financial Autonomy,” TELL, 21 April 2014). Rather than doing hearings, they conduct oversight through three “parlays” per year, where the assembly tells Governor Kayode Fayemi (an opposition governor) their findings. This dependence on the center actually shows great variation, as discussed by Dr. Funmbi Elemo in her excellent chapter in my book in progress, co-edited with Dr. Joseph Fashagba.

Under Nigeria’s elaborate revenue allocation system, states are statutorily entitled to a share of federal funds determined by a formula and administered by the Federal Revenue Allocation Commission. The point of the Commission is to depoliticize the distribution of oil revenues that accrue to the center. But the ruling PDP argues that states’ entitlement is not absolute. The National Assembly’s Hon. Austin Opara told me, “Where there is crisis, the revenues are kept in escrow account.” Withholding the funds has had not only the obvious political effect of infuriating opposition governors, it is also leading Governor Amaechi and others to borrow money from commercial banks, thus creating new debts during a time of national surplus which could soon cloud the rosy picture of the economy being painted by the Minister of Finance. After oil prices dropped in 1980, governors in Nigeria’s Second Republic also took out large loans (See The Rise and Fall of Nigeria’s Second Republic, 1979-84, by Toyin Falola and Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere’s.)

The characterization by Hon. Opara (and other PDP politicians I spoke with) of political instability in Rivers also demonstrates how the ruling party believes it possesses significant discretionary authority since the laws governing revenue allocation do not permit the establishment of such escrow accounts, which can be used as a lever in opposition-controlled states. If such withholding is not politically motivated, then in my ongoing research I expect to identify evidence that PDP strongholds face similar budget constraints. And how will the budgets in other opposition states fare? The formal states of emergency in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa expires soon, but it will almost certainly be re-extended.

Debating the Laws of Decampment

There is a long tradition, going back to the First Republic, of party leaders accusing elected politicians of “anti-party activities.” This was common during Obasanjo’s first term as well. The emergence of the All Progressive Congress (APC), however, for now presents a viable alternative for members whose ambitions are frustrated by the national PDP’s efforts to control candidate selection. Moreover, the mass defections raise doubts about the efficacy of suspensions as tools for promoting party loyalty, according to senior APC politicians. A decline in disciplinary effectiveness could deepen desperation in the PDP.

Rivers State has emerged as a symbol for these issues. The tipping point was last year when the PDP replaced the governor’s close ally in the state party leadership, Ake, with a loyalist of current Minister of Education, Nyesom Wike. Not long after, the governor and the Rivers House of Assembly attempted to remove the Local Government Area chair and council members in Obio-Akpor. Since this is Wike’s home LGA, it became a much larger symbol of the contest between PDP and APC. But it is also of interest because it suggests first, how the three tiers of federalism multiply the possible interactions between local and national political structures. The Rivers governor is withholding funds for the LGA – much like the PDP is withholding funds for Rivers State.

Meeting with Governor Rotimi Chibuike Amaechi at his house in Port Harcourt (April 2014)

Second, this is also of interest because of the role the courts have played. Election observers have routinely looked to the courts as a saving grace in Nigeria’s elections, by serving as a conflict resolution mechanism in disputes over who won particular elections, Buhari’s decision to take his protest to the judiciary rather than the streets in 2011 being the most prominent example out of hundreds of cases. In River State, the courts have upheld the chairmanship of Prince Timothy Nsirim in Obio-Akpor (click here to read the court judgement), but the APC in Rivers says they are appealing the decision which you can download here, and therefore do not recognize him. In other words, control over the Rivers State Assembly and this key LGA remains contested, with two sides in each instance claiming legitimate leadership. Rather than resolving the issue decisively, the courts are stuck in an argument that will draw out for months or even years.

Similarly, a court in Abuja ruled that the “New PDP” is not a faction. If it stands could effectively nullify the constitutional basis for forming the APC. Naturally, the APC is appealing. The key point is that the courts are likely to be much more involved in internal party politics than in previous elections, subjecting them to increased political pressure, and signaling that the Electoral Act for the 2015 elections will need to take careful preventative steps to promote both judicial neutrality and efficiency. The bill’s language on independent candidates will be critical not only because facilitating independent candidates could split opposition supporters and play into the hands of the PDP, but because it could increase politicians’ autonomy by allowing them to circumvent requirements for party factions.

On February 26, four distinguished lawyers debated this and other questions at a forum at American University, co-organized with the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights, the student-run Africa Initiative on campus, and a new diaspora organization, East Africa WashingtonProgram.  The event drew attention from Africa, Europe, and in the Kenyan media.  You can watch a brief clip from the NTV Kenya television coverage here. Participants included:

• Michael S. Greco, former president, American Bar Association
• Regina Njogu, a Washington College of Law alum who offered a vigorous critique of the ICC, and filled in the spot on the panel left vacant by the Hon. Koki Muli, Kenya’s Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations
• Stephen Arthur Lamony, Senior Adviser on AU, UN and Africa Situations Coalition for the International Criminal Court
• Prof. David Bosco, a professor in AU’s School of International Service, and author of Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics, recently published by Oxford University Press

You can watch the entire event on the web page for American University’s Council for African Studies.  You can also download the entire video on Vimeo.

Regina Njogu, Michael Greco, Steve Lamony, and David Bosco (left to right)

A cornerstone of President Obama’s policy towards Africa is a new initiative to expand access to electricity, dubbed “Power Africa”. A great deal of economic research (and common sense) suggests that unreliable power is a major barrier to economic growth and long term development. However a letter signed by 75 African groups across 18 African countries has raised concerns about Power Africa, as well as the Electrify Africa Act and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Ever since the 1990s,

Obama speaking at a power plant in Tanzania, July 2013 (White House photo)

OPIC has been targeted by budget hawks as “corporate welfare” since it helps underwrite financial risks associated with private investment in the developing world.

The signatories to the letter wrote, “We do not need to poison communities in Africa in order to develop sustainably. Consequently, we reject any further extraction of and exploitation of fossil fuels, including natural gas, oil, coal and unconventional fossil fuels” as part of the Power Africa initiative. This letter is particularly relevant to attempts by some to weaken OPIC’s carbon cap. Indeed the groups wrote, “OPIC’s cap on greenhouse gas emissions must not be tampered with, most certainly not in the false name of supplying power to Africa’s poor.” Instead, the African NGOs urged support for “small-scale, decentralized, community-owned renewable energy initiatives throughout the African countryside and cities.”

The letter is again getting wide circulation in Washington as Power Africa and the enabling legislation winds its way through Congress, including today’s markup by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

10 November 2013

Subject: Leave the oil in the soil; leave the coal in the hole

Dear President Obama,

We are African organizations working for the realization of a healthy and just environment for the people of our countries. We believe that every person has the right to a dignified life of quality on a livable planet. The climate crisis — brought on by developed countries — poses a monumental threat to this basic human right.

It is with this in mind that we write to you concerning the Power Africa initiative, as well as congressional legislation apparently meant to operationalize your initiative, including the Electrify Africa Act of 2013. Like you, we feel a great sense of urgency to address the pervasive energy poverty found in most African countries. It is shameful that in 2013, more than two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africa’s population lacks electricity, with that number growing to more than 85 per cent in rural areas.

We are therefore working hard to bring decentralized, truly clean, community-controlled renewable energy to all of our people. We do not need to poison communities in Africa in order to develop sustainably. Consequently, we reject any further extraction and exploitation of fossil fuels, including natural gas, oil, coal, and unconventional fossil fuels.

These dirty fuel projects cause devastating impacts on local health, communities, and the environment. We similarly reject large hydropower projects, and other ‘false solutions’ such as carbon trading and offsetting. Smaller scale solar, wind, and geothermal, and mini-hydro, can provide us with sustainable lives and livelihoods without sinking our health along with that of the continent and the planet.

When we read statements from the White House about “new discoveries of vast reserves of oil and gas”, and that “The recent discoveries of oil and gas in sub-Saharan Africa will play a critical role in defining the region’s prospects for economic growth and stability, as well as contributing to broader near-term global energy security”1 – our response is to say,

• “Leave the oil in the soil; leave the coal in the hole.”
•  It is simply impossible to continue to exploit fossil fuels if we want to avoid climate catastrophe. And we want to avoid climate catastrophe. So do you.
• Climate change is already having a heightened impact in Africa, with increasing temperatures, more floods and droughts, and failing agriculture, which is increasing conflict and threatening the lives and livelihoods of many millions.

Furthermore, we know from many decades of direct experience that the World Bank-driven development model pushing large-scale infrastructure and power projects rarely, if ever, alleviates poverty. Instead, such projects exacerbate inequality and conflict, devastate the environment, and frequently involve human rights violations (i.e. the well-documented “resource curse”). These projects do not help us at home but rather are for export and to line the pockets of multinational corporations and local elites.

But even more troubling is how African poverty has historically been used to line the pockets of U.S. corporations and “experts”. Much of the money given as “aid” to African and other countries actually returns right back to the “experts” and consultants of donor countries 2. It thus troubles us tremendously that Power Africa has been advertised to U.S. audiences as an initiative to benefit U.S. corporations. For example, upon Power Africa’s launch, Forbes 3 wrote that it “greases billions in deals for General Electric”, saying the firm is “perhaps the biggest beneficiary” of the initiative, noting the U.S. Export-Import Bank’s4 central role in financing its ambitions in the region. Indeed, the chair of the Export-Import Bank was quite frank about this over Twitter, referring to Power Africa as a “$7B plan to power up @General Electric”, and he posted a picture of President Obama’s speech on the initiative in Tanzania with a GE logo more than twice the size of the presidential seal.

We therefore urge you to re-think any support for large scale power and infrastructure projects in the name of increasing energy access for Africa. We know that this hasn’t worked in the past, and it won’t work now. What will work are small-scale, decentralized, community-owned renewable energy initiatives throughout the African countryside and cities.

Even the International Energy Agency has said as much. Its 2010 World Energy Outlook found that for universal energy access to occur by 2030, 70 per cent of rural populations will need to be served by decentralized renewable energy, and that electrification strategies should focus heavily on decentralized renewable energy systems, such as small-scale, democratically controlled wind, solar and microhydro co-operatives which meet local needs and end peoples’ reliance on the corporate-controlled energy system. Advances in distributed renewable energy in recent years have made this technology more cost effective than outmoded grid extension from centralized fossil fuel projects; much like cheaper mobile phone technology has made extension of phone lines obsolete. When the externalized cost of fossil fuel projects is factored in — including the cost of harmful health impacts, loss of land, environmental and agricultural damage, and conflicts – distributed renewable energy solutions become even more cost effective than fossil fuel projects.

Unfortunately, to our dismay, we have learned that fossil fuel companies, the ONE Campaign, and even some in the Obama administration are using Power Africa and the Electrify Africa Act to try to weaken crucial gains in U.S. development financing at the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). OPIC’s landmark climate and development policy, which is already having a positive effect in directing the agency’s portfolio toward renewable energy, requires the agency to reduce its fossil fuel financing and increase its renewable energy financing, bringing cleaner energy access to the poor.

OPIC’s cap on greenhouse gas emissions must not be tampered with, most certainly not in the false name of supplying power to Africa’s poor.

Weakening this policy will mean more polluting energy for Africa. What’s more, it may result in increased numbers of large centralized fossil fuel power projects that serve industrial customers but do not increase energy access for the poor, particularly in rural areas.

We thank you for your attention to these most important matters as we all move boldly toward sustainable livelihoods in the face of the climate crisis.

1 The White House Fact Sheet: Power Africa, 30 June, 2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/30/fact-sheet-power-africa.

2 Timothy Mitchell. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity,
University of California press, 2002

3 See http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/07/01/with-power-africa-plan-obama-to-grease-billions-in-deals-for-g-e/.

4 We note that the U.S. Export-Import Bank has gained notoriety for its skyrocketing financing of fossil fuels, including the 4800 MW Kusile power project in South Africa, which is exacerbating energy poverty and causing tremendous local and climate pollution. Indeed, we vociferously protested the Export-Import Bank’s financing of Kusile.

Sincerely,

Abibiman Foundation, Ghana
ADEID, Cameroun
African Alliance for Rangeland Management and Development, Kenya
African Biodiversity Network, Kenya
African Biosafety Centre, South Africa
African Research Association managing Development in Nigeria
AME, Cameroun
Association Nigérienne des Scouts de l’Environnement, Niger
ATTAC Burkina, Burkina Faso
Caravane D’Animation Culturelle Pour Le Development Durably, DRC
Center for Secured Health and Environmental Development Initiatives, Nigeria
Centre for 21st Century Issues, Nigeria
Centre for Civil Society, South Africa
CIKOD, Ghana
Climate Change Network Nigeria
Committee on Vital Environmental Resources, Nigeria
Daughters of Mumbi Global Resource Center, Kenya
Direction Générle des Forêts et des Ressources Naturelles, Bénin
Earth Peoples, Africa
Earthlife Africa Durban, South Africa
Earthlife Africa Jhb, South Africa
Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria
Friends of Lake Turkana, Kenya
Friends of the Earth Africa
Friends of the Earth Ghana
Greater Middelburg Resident’s Association, South Africa
Greenpeace Africa
groundWork, Friends of the Earth, South Africa
Growing Power NPC, South Africa
Health of Mother Earth, Nigeria
Host Community Network Gwagwalada-Abuja, Nigeria
Host Community Network Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria
Host Community Network Chika-Lugbe, Nigeria
Host community Network Karimo, Nigeria
Host Community Network Mape, Nigeria
Institute for Sustainable Development, Ethiopia
Irrigation Training and Economic Empowerment Organization – IRTECO, Tanzania
Jamaa Resource Initiatives, Kenya
Jeunes volontaires pour l’Environnement de la RDC (JVE-RDC), DRC
JFE, Cameeroon
Johannesburg Anglican Environmental Initiative, South Africa
Justiça Ambiental/ Friends of the Earth Mozambique
Kenya Debt Relief Network – KENDREN, Kenya
Labour, Health and Human Rights Development Centre, Nigeria
Les Amis de la Terre-Togo
Maendeleo Endelevu Action Program, Kenya
National Association of Professional Environmentalists, Uganda
Never Ending Food, Malawi
Newcastle Environmental Justice Alliance, South Africa
Next Generation Youth Initiative International (NEGYII), Nigeria
NGO Coalition for Environment (NGOCE), Calabar, Nigeria
Nigerian Conservation Foundation, Nigeria
No REDD in Africa Network
Ogoni Solidarity Forum, Nigeria
Organisation de Bienfaisance et de Dévellopement, Djibouti
Project 90 by 2030, South Africa
Rainforest Resource and Development Centre (RRDC), Nigeria
RAINS, Ghana
SAFCEI, South Africa
South Durban Community Environmental Alliance, South Africa
Southern Cape Land Committee, South Africa
TCOE, South Africa
The Rules, Africa
The Young Environment Network, Nigeria
Unemployed People’s Movement, South Africa
Uniao Nacional de Camponeses (National Farmer Union of Mozambique), Mozambique
University of Kwazulu Natal, South Africa
Wise Administration of Terrestrial Environment and Resources (WATER), Nigeria
Women Environmental Programme Burkina, Burkina Faso
World Neighbours, Africa
Worldview -The Gambia
Young Volunteers for Environment, Ethiopia
Youth Volounteers for the Environment, Zambia
YVE Ghana
350.org Durban, South Africa