Uganda is currently preparing for national elections in 2011.  The contest presents an important challenge to the National Resistance Movement (NRM), in power since Yoweri Museveni overthrew the government in 1986.  But Uganda has emerged as the quintessential semi-authoritarian regime, with the government organizing elections while it centralizes authority, closes political space, and makes gestures of openness to the international community.  Museveni established a government officially without parties until a national referendum opened up the political process in 2005.  Until then the NRM artfully considered itself a movement, rather than a political party, in order to doge electoral stipulations.  Aili Mari Tripp details the architecture and strategy of the “hybrid regime” in her excellent new book, Museveni’s Uganda, published in summer 2010 by Lynne Rienner.

The ruling NRM has cleverly adopted the Global War on Terrorism as a political resource.  Even before the terrorist bombing in the capital in July 2010, the government began closing political space in the name of national security while it successfully obtained aid commitments from the United States to fight counter-insurgency wars, one of which is against the brutal Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the north.

In May 2010 President Obama signed “The ‘Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009” into law (Public Law No: 111-172).  The Act states that the United States will provide “political, economic, military, and intelligence support for viable multilateral efforts to protect civilians from the Lord’s Resistance Army” in addition to providing humanitarian assistance to communities affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army, and continuing to support Uganda’s government.  It designates $10 million from the 2011-2013 fiscal budgets to carry out these activities.  It also gave the White House 180 days to formulate a strategy to end the LRA’s brutal violence.  The NGO Resolve Uganda is counting down the remaining days on its website.

The problem is that the Ugandan government’s recent offensive against the LRA, Operation Lightning Thunder, backfired in the worst ways.  The Ugandan military has an interest in portraying the operation as a counter-terrorism success, and activists are rightfully concerned about the LRA’s brutal campaign of terror and recruitment of child soldiers see an American commitment as key to a solution.  But as the New York Times reported last year, the U.S. helped plan and pay for an attack that resulted in over 900 civilian deaths.  A series of articles by Ronald Atinkson in the London Independent further claimed that successes against the LRA had been exaggerated.

The difficulty of reconciling the forces of democratization with the country’s national security state was the subject of a letter that a dozen advocacy organizations sent to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton.  Chief among their concerns is the danger that the U.S. will continue to provide security assistance without due consideration for human rights abuses being carried out by government forces.  Assistance currently includes International Military Education and Training (IMET) and some modest Foreign Military Financing.  Research by Human Rights Watch raises concerns about whether U.S. aid is in compliance with the Leahy Amendment, which prohibits assistance to individuals with a record of human rights abuses.  Ugandan and international activists are profoundly concerned about abuses by counter-terrorism units such as the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT), some of its former directors have received U.S. training.

Even if human rights protections are put in place, they are often easily circumvented by simply renaming the program, a practice I detailed in my 2005 book, In Democracy’s Shadow based on my Capitol Hill oversight experience.

Exporting the Worst of the PATRIOT Act?

The unfortunate truth for now is that the Ugandan government has effectively leveraged its fight against terrorism to grant itself broad authorities, which the NRM is using to its political advantage.  The government passed sweeping legislation in 2007 authorizing government eavesdropping, describing the Interception of Communications bill as an effort to fight crime and terrorism in the country.  The law gives the security minister the broad latitude to establish a Monitoring Center and to intercept communications throughout Uganda.  Through the receipt of a mere verbal request from a government institution, the government can intercept communications if there are “reasonable grounds” to believe:

• a felony has been or will probably be committed;
• the gathering of information concerning an actual threat to national security or any national economic interest is necessary;
• the gathering of information concerning a potential threat to public safety, national security, or any national interest is necessary;
• or there is a threat to the national interest involving the state’s international relations or obligations.

The legislation comes at a time when the Ugandan government is using this kind of broad authority to intimidate journalists and undermine government critics, thus making open competition in next year’s elections even more difficult than it already is.  As the July letter from US-based advocacy organizations argued, the bill is a sign that the government of Uganda will “further backslide on civil liberties and human rights obligations while using the bombings and the fight against terrorism as a shield from scrutiny.”

Development Slippage

Looking beyond the Pentagon, Washington is clearly aware of Uganda’s governance drift.  For example the US announced that will not renew 10 million dollars committed through Millennium Challenge Corporation to help Uganda move from “threshold” status to a full compact (ie, an agreement) for aid.  USAID’s plans call for strengthening democratic institutions, enhancing political competition, and improving parliamentary capacity for oversight through partnerships with civil society.  Unfortunately USAID faces an uphill battle, with no increases in the lines funding for either for civil society programs or for its good governance in Uganda, and cuts are planned for programs relating to “political competition and consensus building.” Even aid to fight transnational crime is slated for cuts.

Whatever Uganda policy the Obama administration lays out this fall needs to put securitization back in the context of democratization.  Neither peace nor good governance will be feasible without a strong commitment to accountability which extends to America’s straying allies in the war on terror.

A new report by the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, DC offers a broad analysis of the internal migration and cross-border trends affecting Nigeria.  Entitled “Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant,” the report gives a historical overview of the major post-independence trends, ranging from unsettled claims from the Biafran Civil War to current problems raised by human trafficking and the significant displacement triggered by the expansion of Shari’a in the northern states starting after the transition to democracy in 1999.

During a trip to Nigeria in 2008, I was struck by the first billboard I saw on the airport road in Abuja, highlighting the problem of human trafficking. According to government agencies, at least 10,000 people are trafficked from Nigeria each year.  The report also mentions how the state of Akwa Ibom in particular is apparently a source for people eventually forced into domestic servitude.

Religious violence in Plateau and Kaduna states regularly gets international attention.  The Biafran question, by contrast, remains one of at least three migration issues lurking in the background.  A prominent Igbo politician told me during a 2006 interview that compensation for property seized during the war remains a source of great resentment in the southeast; many cases are still stuck in the courts.  Worse, he said, the ruling People’s Democratic Party has neglected the issue entirely, and he further complained about under-representation of the east in the Federal government’s civil service and military ranks (which has possibly been addressed a bit more since then).

Second, like the human rights report I co-authored with Patrick Ukata, the MPI report also mentions the problem of discrimination against people from other states.  Discrimination against Nigerians treated as “strangers” in their own country is behind much of the recent violence in Plateau – the religious overtones were present but arguably shallow by causal comparison.  For an interesting theoretical framework for these issues, check out David Laitin’s classic Culture and Hegemony.

A third issue not discussed in the report, but one which will may become another flash point in the near future, is the displacement of people who migrated to Abuja, especially after the democratic transition.  Tens of thousands of people were displaced first during beautification campaigns (my favorite bars in Zone 4 are gone, and my favorite bukkas in Wuse 2 were destroyed to make way for Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000).    More recently demolitions have been part of efforts to ensure that the city of Abuja conforms as much as possible to its original plan. I am working to obtain funding for a collaborative research project with the University of Ibadan in the summer of 2011 to interview those affected – and those profiting from this destruction.   I took this picture (below) near Idu in March 2010.  During meetings with Ibgo self-help organizations, members told me stories of how they rented property from chiefs belonging Abuja’s indigenes, then when their homes and businesses were destroyed by the government’s Ministry for the Federal Capital Territory, the migrants discovered they had no recourse because either the chiefs did not have the authority to rent to them in the first place, or their properties did not have building permits.

Resentment is building, and it is impossible for these working class families to afford housing within the city itself; traffic was non-existent when I lived in Abuja and now it takes upwards of an hour to commute into the city each morning for most of the people who clean the floors and answer the phones.  Thanks to MPI for providing excellent background on migration issues generally, and I hope to provide more insights into the Abuja question after I have had a chance to do more research in the city’s informal settlements.

According to a “sensitive but unclassified” report from the U.S. State Department’s Inspector General on the US Embassy in Ethiopia just released, the Embassy suffered high staff turnover in the wake of unpopular decisions pushed through by the Bush Administration.  As a result, it is struggling to cope with important changes, including a pending facility move and a massive influx of Department of Defense staff.

The report describes the Embassy as “akin to a forward military base” and raises concerns about civilian staff being overwhelmed by DOD personnel who need to be more closely controlled by the diplomats.  According to the IG, the Embassy staff is “somewhat underpowered in terms of dealing with other agencies within the mission, including a dozen or so Department of Defense elements, some not entirely under chief of mission authority and/or prone to resist the chargé’s authority almost to the point of insubordination” (emphasis added).

This elaborates upon a problem documented in a 2006 Minority Staff report prepared by Senator Richard Lugar’s staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign.  It is also important because DOD emphasized partnerships with civilian authority in order to sell its Africa Command (AFRICOM) to the American and African publics.  The IG report offers troubling evidence that three years after the controversies slipped from the public view, lines of authority remained blurred and the diplomatic ingredient of the “3 D’s” remains overshadowed by defense.   The DOD staff embedded in the Embassy also includes a media relations team, suggesting involvement in the “phase zero” operations designed to shape potential conflict environments.  As numerous former diplomats have told me over the last year, U.S. ambassadors have very limited control over these operations so they often work at odds with U.S. diplomatic strategies.

Training and Foreign Aid Despite Human Rights Violations?

A December 2009 visit by a senior Department of Defense official (reportedly the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa Vicki Huddleston) increased the likelihood that Ethiopia will regain its eligibility for Section 1206 military assistance.   Unless strict conditions have been satisfied, the Leahy Amendment prohibits assistance furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any foreign security forces if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights.  Ethiopia was originally de-qualified for this aid following the 2005 elections.  Today, evidence of such violations is abundant, notwithstanding the relative calm on Election Day this year.  As Human Rights Watch pointed out last week in Congressional testimony, “voters were intimidated at almost every stage” of the process.  Repression remains widespread, thanks in no small part to a sweeping Anti-Terrorism Proclamation issued last year.  (For some solid and balanced comparative research on the effects of exporting American counter-terror legislation, check out the work of political scientist Beth Whitaker at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte.)

Thus the likely resumption of military training and financing is surprising, and in my opinion threatens to bring the U.S. back to the bad old Cold War days of choosing security over democracy.  Remember El Salvador?  Apparently not.  Even though the Embassy staff is managing well in a number of areas, the Inspector General further suggests that an increase in government repression will not alter the U.S. reliance on Ethiopia to provide stability for the region.

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is launching a think tank based in Germany to inform and support DOD missions.   The AFRICOM SSRC Information Paper explains that the Social Science Research Center (SSRC) will be staffed by a core group of scholars with PhDs  who will also be able to deploy Socio-Cultural Research and Advisory Teams (SCRAT) to the field, in coordination with in-country teams.  “For example, prior to a U.S. military exercise, a SCRAT may conduct a socio-cultural assessment to better focus U.S. efforts and develop beneficial objectives.  They may then accompany U.S. forces during the exercise in a cultural advisory capacity and conduct a post-exercise assessment of the impact on the local population.”

The written products and research activities “will be conducted in an atmosphere of full disclosure and transparency,” and the SSRC director Dr. Christopher Varhola is so far taking this seriously by openly circulating the SSRC Guidelines and Procedures which you can download here.  Because the guidelines are still in draft form, this is an opportunity for Africanists to constructively share their ideas and concerns — without necessarily endorsing AFRICOM or its missions.

I have several concerns, the first of which centers on the ability of the SSRC to comply with its stated commitment to the “do no harm” principle in Section 5 of the guidelines.  SSRC researchers plan to comply with human rights and research conventions “to the best of our abilities.”  In addition the Code of Ethics in Appendix A states that scholars “will not directly support the use of armed force” (emphasis added).  This language reads like an obvious loophole; the American Anthropology Association’s standards perhaps offer a stronger model here.  Though the guidelines also contain strong language requiring informed consent “freely given…from all participants”, there is no apparent independent check comparable to a university human subjects approval process to promote compliance and protection of subjects.  To maintain the trust of local populations, and to not “harm our credibility as social scientists” (Section 2B) such a check is essential.

The SSRC also lacks sufficient independence in critical respects.  Section 3 of the guidelines states that “All research designs must be approved by a U.S. Africa Command panel.”  I have one question: Why? Though the panel will “likely” include outside academic reviewers, and the intent is to “balance institutional needs and constraints with academic freedom,” the authorities as stated and the process as described sets up a lopsided balance of interests.  This may even make SSRC researchers themselves vulnerable.  Researchers instead need incentives to design projects that can deliver honest and blunt assessments — and they need protection from interference with their ability to publicly and widely share such information.  For a historical perspective, some of the hazards of scholarly collaboration with the national security state are discussed in a compelling chapter by Dwyer and Dwyer in my co-edited book, In Democracy’s Shadow: the Secret World of National Security. You can also check out The Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945 – 1960 by Christopher Simpson.

During his April 12 address to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, Nigeria’s Acting President, Goodluck Jonathan adopted the tone and tenor of a reformer.  Unfortunately he offered only a few encouraging signs of reform.

He outlined electoral reform, Niger Delta development, fighting corruption, and improving electricity as his principle goals.   This indicates a refreshing sense of consistency with his other recent messages, suggesting that there is indeed a “Jonathan Agenda” taking shape.  This agenda has been properly discrete, given the lingering uncertain status of Yar’Adua’s health.  Yet to establish his credibility abroad and to generate political support for reform at home, Jonathan will have to provide a level of detail that is so far missing during his visit.  He will also have to prioritize what so far sounds a bit like a laundry list of Nigeria’s ongoing challenges.

His reticence about his meeting with Obama the day before is understandable, and there was even a hint in his CFR comments that he was surprised that several other people attended what he thought was going to be a private meeting.

Electoral Reform

Jonathan’s public commitment to electoral reform is refreshing and significant.  His stated commitment to allowing observers would depart from the strategy of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in 2007, which involved erecting obstacles for domestic and international civil society.  He made clear that results should be declared at the polling unit level too, which he specified as a valuable means of demonstrating that elections are fair and verifiable.  Such issues will fall in the lap of INEC, and following the firing of the attorney general and then the cabinet a few weeks later,  Maurice Iwu, the discredited chair of INEC has been awaiting his fate.  Jonathan provided some clues as to his next step by indicating that the term of several commissioners will soon expire, implying that Iwu’s dismissal is only a matter of time.

The disadvantage to waiting, of course, is that the 2011 election then becomes another hurried preparation process, replete with systematic corruption that can be blamed on logistical problems — which was precisely my own observation during 2003.   A more urgent concern is his allusion that much of this reform can be accomplished without legislation.  This comes as a great surprise since the National Assembly has been feverishly working on electoral reform amendments for several months, which will certainly require Jonathan’s signature.  Electoral reform decreed or administratively implemented by an acting president is a recipe for electoral dystopia.

Human Rights and the Niger Delta

His answers were decidedly evasive on two key questions yesterday: First, asked about impunity by a representative of Human Rights Watch in the audience, Jonathan said that the security forces often respond heavily because they are outgunned – and those guns significantly come from the West.  While he entirely has my sympathy, and the U.S. Congressional Research Service has indeed documented alarming arms export trends to Africa, this response has little to do with him making a commitment from the top to investigate and prosecute human rights violations at all levels and to follow the trail wherever it may lead (anyone watching Kenya?) His reference to the weather in Plateau State as a source of the migration that in turn led to violence in Jos sounded downright odd, and perhaps a bit like Montesquieu.

Nevertheless, his request for help from the U.S. on stemming small arms traffic in Nigeria is a near 180 degree reversal from the statements offered by Nigerian Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe all through last year.  Africom, will you stem the flow of arms or will you contribute to the flow of arms?  Obama has an opportunity to respond to a major African leader ‘s offer by creating disincentives for commercial arms sales and by enhancing the human rights conditionalities placed on government financing for arms sales.

Second, Jonathan’s response on the Niger Delta properly outlined the basic elements of the ongoing amnesty program, including demobilization and reintegration.  But he missed an opportunity to demonstrate his seriousness by acknowledging its tragically modest progress so far — including reintegration camps for hundreds of militants without adequate toilets or showers and overpayment for disarmament.  Though he has been intimately involved in the amnesty — and thus he carries some of the burden of these shortcomings — he also has an opportunity to increase the chances of this program’s success under his leadership now.

Is Nigeria Really Going Nuclear?

The moderator, former ambassador Howard Jeter, also asked a thoughtful question about Nigeria’s leadership on foreign policy.  The easy answer, since Jonathan is in town after all for a nuclear summit, would have been to say that Africa is a nuclear free continent thanks to successful arms control (see Joe Cirincione’s excellent book on the history of nuclear weapons), and that Nigeria will exercise its leadership to keep it that way.  Instead, the Acting President’s talking points produced a meandering answer that included Nigeria’s interest in nuclear power (!), acknowledging the critical role of the IAEA of course.

What next for Nigeria, Mr. Acting President?  We await his public comments tomorrow.